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The relationship between terrorism and poverty: a case study of boko haram in Nigeria, 2020-2024.

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**SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, ARTS, AND HUMANITIES.
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, POLITICS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TERRORISM AND POVERTY: A CASE STUDY
OF BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA, 2020-2024.**

**BY
UKACHUKWU CHIKWENDU PETER**

**THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, ARTS, AND
HUMANITIES. DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, POLITICS, AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS OF NEAPOLIS UNIVERSITY PAFOS IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER'S DEGREE IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATION, STRATEGY, AND SECURITY.**

JUNE, 2024.

DECLARATION

I affirm that this research project is my original creation and assert my rightful authorship. None of the content contained herein has been previously submitted to support an application for any academic degree or qualification, whether at this institution or elsewhere. However, in instances where I have drawn upon the work of other authors, whether sourced from printed materials, online resources, or any other medium, I have diligently acknowledged and referenced their contributions by the guidelines set forth by the department and the University at large.

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SIGNATURE

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SIGNATURE DATE

DEDICATION

I humbly dedicate this thesis to my beloved daughters, Chinecherem El'lora Chikwendu and Chimamanda Ariel Chikwendu, as well as to my beloved wife, Mrs. V.O Chikwendu, who embodies strength and grace like a lioness. May the boundless love of God illuminate every facet of your lives, both now and forever, through the guiding light of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. Amen.

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Praise and honour belong to the Almighty God for his boundless grace and the wonders he has done in my life. He is the architect of the cosmos, the artisan behind every creation, and the genesis of humanity itself. Through his son, Jesus Christ, we find redemption. My heartfelt gratitude extends to Him for guiding me through the journey to completing my M.Sc. program in International Relations, Strategy, and Security (M.Sc. IRSS).

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ABSTRACT

Boko Haram's violent activities in Nigeria have plunged the country into poverty, evident even in 2024. This study examines how Boko Haram's actions impacted Nigeria's economic stability, notably the food shortages in 2024. It also explores government measures to address the consequences of Boko Haram attacks.

Religious fundamentalism theory will be used as the theoretical framework of analysis. The main focus of religious fundamentalism is that adherents strictly adhere to the foundational tenets of their faith, often rejecting modern interpretations and seeking to establish a society based on their religious doctrine. Boko Haram terrorist organization is closely aligned with religious fundamentalist doctrine in its fight against Western education, attacks on government institutions, and implementation of Sharia Law. Boko Haram's actions show that this theoretical framework is relevant to understanding and dealing with the threat posed by the group, as they are motivated to construct a society regulated by their interpretation of Islam.

Perhaps, this hypothesis of Boko Haram's actions can be explained by the religious fundamentalism theory which emphasizes the group's dedication to enforcing its extreme ideologies, strict adherence to religious teachings, and rejection of both secular government and Western education.

Moreover, the aim is to demonstrate how religion shaped Boko Haram's actions, contributing to ongoing hardship and poverty in Nigeria, evident even in 2024.

However, Boko Haram's activities, including attacks on infrastructure and displacement of communities, and farmlands, have undoubtedly worsened existing economic challenges in the northern region, and Nigeria at large leading to a cause in the poverty rate in 2024.

In this thesis, data will be sourced through secondary or documentary data collection methods, which will include journals, articles, the Internet, and local Newspapers, among others.

The findings of this thesis will identify the related impact of Boko-Haram terrorist organizations on the citizens of Nigeria specifically the northern part of the country. The study will make recommendations that can contribute to the existing knowledge and help reduce this deadly organization's violent activities.

The purpose of this thesis, however, is to critically analyze the effects of Boko Haram, a terrorist group that has destroyed farmlands, and government buildings, kidnapped people, and forced people to flee their homes in Nigeria, particularly in the northern part of the country. As a result, as of 2024, the country is still deeply impoverished.

As a Nigerian, I feel that Boko Haram's actions have financially drained the nation because

more emphasis has been focused on combating the group, allowing other sectors to suffer. In 2024, the amount of poverty and hunger in the nation will be extremely concerning.

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

Boko-Haram terrorist organization is a serious threat to Nigeria's security and the society at large because it has caused a series of damage through its actions such as bombings, killings, kidnappings, and rape, among others which has continued to push the country toward abject poverty in 2024. The violent activities of the extremist Islamic sect, Boko-Haram have made Nigeria a country of serious security concern for the international community and a subject of research interest for scholars focusing on terrorism and violent extremism. However, terrorism, being a reprehensible criminal act, instills fear and intimidation among the population, necessitating the acquisition of information as a measure in the fight against it.

The idea behind this study is to examine the impact of Boko Haram, a terrorist organization responsible for the destruction of farmlands, and government infrastructure, widespread kidnappings, and forced displacement of civilians in Nigeria, particularly in the northern region, resulting in enduring poverty in the country as of 2024.

Onuoha (2014), believed that Boko Haram originated in northern Nigeria in the mid-1990s very little academic and security attention was paid to it until July 2009 when it engaged state security forces in a major uprising in five northern states of Nigeria. The revolt ended when its charismatic leader Mohammed Yusuf was finally captured and later brutally murdered by police. Mohammed Yusuf and his followers say that the introduction of Islamic law (Sharia) in the 12 northern states of Nigeria was insufficient and that the country's ruling class as a whole was marred with corruption and even Muslim northern leaders were irredeemably tainted by western style ambitions. The group envisages a pure Sharia state would ostensibly be both more transparent and just than the existing order.

Awortu (2015), says after the 2009 crackdown, Boko Haram became disorganized and went underground for a year before resurfacing in 2010 as a full-blown terrorist group, with attacks on police stations and military barracks to avenge the supposed killings of Mohammed Yusuf and others comrades. The group carried out jailbreaks to free members. It demanded the prosecution of Yusuf's killers, the release of detained colleagues, the restoration of its destroyed mosque, and compensation for members killed by troops.

Simonnelli (2014), says on Tuesday, April 15, 2014, the terrorist organization Boko-Haram attacked a girl's school in Chibok, Borno State in northern Nigeria abducting between 250-300 young school girls. Boko-Haram leader Abubakar Shekau who took over as a result of Yusuf's death released a video on May 5, threatening to sell the girls as wives and citing ideological opposition to the education of young girls. It is pertinent to discuss the Nigerian state briefly.

Tonry (2014), describes Nigeria as African most populous country with more than 250 ethnic groups. The Hausa and Fulani make up 29 percent of the population, the Yoruba 21 percent, the Igbo (Ibo) 18 percent, and the Ijaw 10 percent, with a plethora of other groups providing the remaining 22 percent.

Christopher, et al (2023), opines that Nigeria's large economy and burgeoning soft power make it a critical emerging power in Africa. But domestic problems demand that Nigeria steer a careful middle path between the United States and its adversaries Christopher, et al (2023). Nigeria has a rich cultural heritage. Cultural practices include extended family; adequate care for new mothers for 40 days after delivery; prolonged breastfeeding; and respect for elders, (Alabi, 1990).

However, the study will generally discuss Hoko Haram's terrorism as a cause of the rise in the poverty rate in Nigeria. This is important because Nigeria is currently faced with several challenges such as shortages of food resulting from the fact that farm activities have been impeded because of Boko Haram's actions, among others.

RESEARCH STATEMENT

The paper aims to investigate how Boko Haram's attacks on communities, farmlands, etc in Nigeria's north-eastern region significantly escalated poverty levels. The disruption of important infrastructure worsened existing economic vulnerabilities, leading to widespread job losses, and decreased investment, creating an inordinate network of violence and poverty. In order words, the study looks at how Boko Haram's insurgency has affected Nigeria's economic situation to determine how terrorism contributes to poverty in Nigeria, especially in the northern part. The research aims to contribute to a better understanding of the broader implications of counterterrorism strategies on poverty alleviation and sustainable development in areas affected by terrorist activities especially the northern part of Nigeria by offering valuable insights into the established relationships between security challenges and economic situation. However, this analysis will be done through some case studies using between 2020 to 2024 events.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The following research questions will be addressed in the study:

What factors, including historical, ideological, and external influences, have shaped Boko-Haram's evolving strategies? The historical, and ideological influence of Boko Haram will usher the readers into having good knowledge of the events that have continued to shape extremism in Nigeria, particularly in the north-eastern part as regards the terrorism perpetrated by Boko Haram insurgence, in Nigeria which has contributed to the rise in the poverty rate in 2024.

What are the effects of Boko-Haram's actions on the economic activities of Nigeria in 2024? Boko Haram organization through the employment of its terror strategies has plunged the country into a high rate of poverty as experienced in 2024, and this is done through violent means of bombing farmlands, markets, and government institutions, and kidnapping, among others, resulting to shortages of farm products (foods), etc.

What strategies has the Nigerian Government employed to counter Boko-Haram's insurgency in Nigeria? However, military operations are always in place in the country to fight internal and external challenges or insecurity, and collaboration with other neighbouring countries as well are the strategies over the years that have continued to yield an impact in the fight against terrorism in 2024 specifically using Operation Deep Punch as a case study.

Moreover, the introductory chapter of the study will give a general guide to the study. In chapter one we will talk about the historical, and ideological factors, the socio-economic situation in Nigeria, government's main strategies, among others. The reason for discussing the history of Boko Haram specifically the ideological aspect as shown in the work entails that radical extremism was introduced in northern Nigeria very long ago and that Boko Haram only derived its ideology from the ideas of previous Islamist ideologists. The second chapter will be the literature review, methodology, theoretical framework and definition of concepts, such concepts that will be defined include (Boko Haram's view on social justice, rule of law, inequality, etc). Chapter three will narrow the study to specifically discuss the following case study: Boko Haram's ideological nexus in 2024, Operation Deep Punch, and MNJTF as a counterterrorism network in 2024, and the effects of Boko Haram on agriculture specifically farming as Nigeria currently experiencing food shortage in 2024. Chapter four will state the thesis findings. Chapter five of the study will make recommendations and a conclusion.

HYPOTHESIS

Based on the research questions, the following are the research Hypotheses:

An ideology centred on grievances has been formed by the group's historical roots in the socio-political environment of Nigeria, which is characterized by economic inequality, ethnic conflicts, and colonial legacies. The goals and strategies of Boko Haram have also been influenced by the radical Islamist ideology that has spread throughout the world through jihadist movements. For examination, the Jihadist movement of Ottoman dan Fodio has continued to influence radicalism in Nigeria. Boko Haram's ideological nexus in the north-eastern part of the country was influenced by the radical views of Ottoman Dan Fodio.

Important economic activities have been hindered by the Boko Haram insurgency, especially in the north-eastern area, which has resulted in infrastructure destruction, and disruptions of agricultural techniques. This implies, that food security has been drastically hindered and economic vulnerabilities have been affected by a decrease in agricultural productivity. For example, in 2024 seven major Nigeria-producing states in North-West and North-East Nigeria such as Borno, Adamawa, Kaduna, Katsina, Yobe, Sokoto, and Zamfara are vulnerable to food crises as a result of insecurity. Food insecurity may result from the lower living standards in the area brought on by violent conflicts (Punch, 2024). However, the effect of Boko Haram on agricultural products specifically farming in northern Nigeria in 2024 as a case study will be examined.

To undermine Boko Haram's operational capacity, the government has conducted cooperative military operations, frequently with assistance from other countries. This entails focused counterterrorism operations in addition to regular warfare. However, the case study to examine is how far a military strategy like Operation Lafia Dole which metamorphosed into

Operation Deep Punch, etc has gone in its counterterrorism against Boko Haram (EASO, 2021).

OBJECTIVE OF THE THESIS

The objective of this thesis is to critically examine the effects of Boko Haram as a terrorist organization that has caused several destructions such as bombing, kidnapping, etc in Nigeria, especially in the northern region of the country through the following:

The study will analyze, specifically the Boko Haram organization's ideological base or nexus in 2024 in Nigeria, the influence it gained through the violent Islamic ideologies of previous scholars like Ottoman Dan Fodio. However, Boko Haram's violent ideological stance on Sharia law plunges the northeastern region of the country into abject poverty. For example, Agbiboa (2013), pointed out the history of militant religiosity of Sheik Othman Dan Fodio's successful 19th-century jihad established the sharia-governed Sokoto Caliphate. The Northern Nigeria region's political legitimacy has since been tied to Islam, shaping a ruling class that sees itself as the defender of the state. However, the ideas have continued to influence radicalism in the northeastern region and Nigeria in general among Muslim faithful even in 2024.

Secondly, as an objective, the thesis will critically examine Boko Haram's terrorist organization activities on economic stability in Nigeria specifically, Boko Haram's attacks such as bombings on farming activities in the northern region which have resulted in food shortages in the country leading to mass protests in 2024. For example, Punch (2024) pointed out that in 2024 seven major Nigeria food producing states in North-West and North-East Nigeria such as Borno, Adamawa, Kaduna, Katsina, Yobe, Sokoto, and Zamfara are vulnerable to food crises as a result of insecurity. Food insecurity may result from the lower living standards in the area and Nigeria at large brought on by violent conflicts.

Finally, as an objective, the research aims to add to successful counterterrorism policies and efforts such as Operation Deep Punch (Operation Lafia Dole), the Multinational Joint Taskforce, etc that was put in place by the Nigerian government, regional collaboration, and international organizations to lessen Boko Haram's disruptive influence by identifying and curbing the fundamental motivations fuelling its violence. For example, EASO (2021) pointed out the establishment of a military formation or operation known as Operation Lafiya Dole (Peace by Force) in 2015 which metamorphosed into Operation Deep Punch in 2021, and the Multinational Joint Taskforce, etc.

However, by focusing on these objectives, the research will contribute to improving our understanding of the complex dynamics surrounding Boko Haram and guiding the development of new counterterrorism programs, etc.

IMPACT OF RESEARCH STUDY

This study will examine the strategies used by the Nigerian government to fight the Boko Haram terrorist organization, particularly, military operations like Operation Lafia Dole which metamorphosed into Operation Deep Punch, the Multinational Joint Taskforce (MNJTF), etc. The results aim to guide policy adjustments, enhancing counterterrorism effectiveness for a more secure country. Despite these efforts, complete eradication of Boko Haram remains elusive.

Again, the study will also examine the implication of Boko Haram attacks on economic activities, particularly, farming activities in the northeastern region, and how government responses can guide future policies, resource allocation, and stability interventions in affected states. For instance, Punch (2024) pointed out “the worsened food insecurity in Nigeria leading to protests in 2024 where seven major food-producing states in North-West and North-East Nigeria such as Borno, Adamawa, Kaduna, Katsina, Yobe, Sokoto, and Zamfara face food crises due to insecurity perpetrated by Boko Haram’s terrorist organization, underscoring the urgency for comprehensive strategies to end Boko Haram’s attacks such as bombings on food production chains.”

Furthermore, examining the historical and ideological roots of Boko Haram particularly, Boko Haram’s ideological nexus in 2024 can offer insights into complex counterterrorism approaches, such as offering amnesty, rehabilitation, and religious re-orientation to members.

SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

The significance of studying Boko Haram's impact on Nigeria lies in understanding its role in worsening poverty levels. By analyzing how Boko Haram's attacks disrupt communities and farmlands, leading to economic vulnerabilities, job losses, and decreased investment, this research sheds light on the intricate relationship between terrorism and poverty in Nigeria's northern region.

However, Boko Haram is primarily domiciled in northern Nigeria due to several factors, including historical grievances, economic inequality, and religious tensions. Recruitment into Boko Haram’s group has been aided by the marginalization and poverty of northern Nigeria’s region, as well as the fact that some demographic populations or a good number of persons find resonance in the group's ideology. In addition, porous borders and weak governance in the area provide fertile ground for Boko Haram’s operations and expansion.

Figure 1: Boko Haram’s affected states, and border countries



International Organization for Migration (IOM), the UN Migration Agency 2016, map of Boko Haram’s affected states, and border countries, accessed 30 March 2024. https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1486/files/press_release/file/IOM-WCA-LCBC-Regional-DTM-Dec2016.pdf

Furthermore, analyzing these dynamics such as Boko Haram’s attacks on farming activities, ideological nexus, and counterterrorism measures contributes to a broader understanding of

how counterterrorism strategies in Nigeria can improve poverty alleviation and sustainable development efforts. This research not only highlights the immediate economic consequences of Boko Haram's activities but also underscores the importance of addressing security challenges to promote long-term economic stability in Nigeria, particularly in its northern region where Boko Haram is domiciled.

However, this thesis will serve as a guide for students who would be interested in conducting further research by combining these studies to better inform policymakers, especially in light of Boko Haram's recent operations, which have contributed to the cause of the poverty rate in Nigeria in 2024.

METHODOLOGY

This research will employ a secondary data analysis methodology to address the outlined research questions. Documentary sources for data will include academic articles, online local national Newspapers, and reputable international organizations' publications. For the assessment of government strategies against Boko Haram, online, and scholarly analyses will be used to gather information about the range of counterinsurgency measures implemented. The reason for employing documentary sources is that information about Boko Haram cannot be sourced primarily here and secondary data became imperative in this situation.

SCOPE OF STUDY

The scope of this thesis is delimited to the spring of 2024 and focuses on analyzing the strategies employed by the Nigerian Government to fight the Boko Haram terrorist organization. It will delve into the effectiveness of military operations such as Operation Lafia Dole and subsequent initiatives like Operation Deep Punch, MNJTF, etc. In addition, the study will analyze the economic effect of Boko Haram's activities and the government's responses, particularly regarding farming activities. By examining historical and ideological factors particularly, Boko Haram's ideological nexus in 2024, the research aims to provide insights for more informed counterterrorism measures, potentially including avenues such as amnesty, rehabilitation, and religious re-orientation for Boko Haram's ex-members. Through these analyses, this thesis seeks to contribute to the understanding of Boko Haram dynamics and inform policies aimed at enhancing national security and stability in Nigeria. Data for the research is sourced from different articles, journals, and the internet on the relevant information that relates to the study.

LIMITATION OF STUDY

The research study has some limitations. The research will focus on studying the work of researchers who have written on a similar topic.

For example, the study is limited to discussing the strategies the Nigerian Government employed to counter Boko Haram's terrorist organization, such as Operation Lafia Dole (Operation Deep Punch), etc, as pointed out by EASO (2021) "to combat the Boko Haram insurgency, the government has substantially depended on military deployments Operation Lafia Dole, etc."

However, the study is also limited to discussing how Boko-Haram's activities impacted the economic stability of Nigeria, especially, food production (farming). Boko Haram's bombings of farmlands, and supply chains have affected food production. Haruna (2020)

pointed out that Boko Haram's attacks on transportation infrastructure, including roads and bridges, have hindered economic activities, isolated communities, and disrupted supply chains, contributing to increased poverty in northern Nigeria.”

The study is also limited to discussing the factors, including historical, ideological, etc, that have shaped Boko Haram’s evolving strategies, particularly Boko Haram's ideological nexus in 2024 using the instance of the radical Islamic ideology of Ottoman Dan Fodio’s influence on Boko Haram.

However, situational and environmental factors like noise, and so on are other limitations. Also, limited materials and finances are limitations to the study. The essence of stating these limitations is to provide a clear and direct presentation of the limitations to enhance the reader's understanding.

CHAPTER ONE

THESIS GENERAL KNOWLEDGE ON BOKO HARAM: THE EVOLUTION OF BOKO HARAM, THE FORMATION OF BOKO HARAM, BOKO HARAM TERRORISM AND POVERTY, BOKO HARAM RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS, COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES TO COMBAT BOKO HARAM, CONCEPTUAL EXPLANATIONS, ETC, (PAGES 15-31)

1.1 THE EVOLUTION OF BOKO HARAM FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO 2001

The idea behind the establishment of Boko Haram can be traced down to the nineteenth century this is because Ottoman Dan Fodio's ideology laid the violent Islamic foundation that influenced the Islamist radicalism that came into existence after his death (Marc-Antoine, 2020). Before Mohammed Yusuf's Boko Haram, there were previous Islamist radical groups that existed, although many of them were not given international attention because they were not as sophisticated as Mohammed Yusuf's Boko Haram.

According to Agbiboa (2013), a history of militant religion in Northern Nigeria dating back to Sheik Othman Dan Fodio's victorious jihad in the 19th century resulted in the creation of the Sokoto Caliphate, which Sharia ruled. Islam continued to be essential to the northern ruling class's legitimacy and shaped their identity as protectors of the state. The area's exposure to secular power was altered by the British occupation in 1903. The 1960s Maitatsine protests were a manifestation of opposition to Western education, stemming from the rigid interpretation of Islam that had been in place since Dan Fodio's holy war. He further attributes Nigeria's post-independence political instability, ethnic conflict, and economic hardship, which are fed by discontent with these obstacles, to extremist groups such as Boko Haram.

Figure 2: Sokoto Caliphate



Madani Timbuktu Traditions 2012, Map of Sokoto Caliphate, digital image, accessed 30 March, 2024, <https://madanitimbukti.wordpress.com/2012/05/12/the-sakwatto-model/sokoto-caliphate2/>

ICG (2010), in the article titled 'Northern Nigeria: Background to conflict, explained that "the Fulani kings significantly influenced the Islamic traditions in the area, fostering a common culture that transcended racial divides and eradicating indigenous religious rituals through the stricter application of Sharia law. The emergence of the Hausa-Fulani identity resulted from the integration of some Hausa rituals by Fulani rulers. Despite this, the Caliphate faced resistance, particularly from Fulani nobles, and experienced a general lack of security along its borders. High taxes in the region contributed to both the consolidation of

authority and periodic uprisings. During British colonial rule (1900–1960), Nigeria underwent substantial restructuring, with local governance aligned with British objectives. The British introduced significant legal, cultural, and political changes to avoid direct interference with the area's social institutions.”

According to Mustafa and Abubakar (2023), in their article titled ‘Boko-Haram and Terrorism in Nigeria: Reflections on the Origin, Impact, and Government Response contends that “Boko Haram, also known as Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad, is not the first radical Islamic group in Nigeria advocating for a return to religious rule and the rejection of Western values since the 1940s. Social movements against British colonialism emerged in northeast Nigeria, leading to divisions among communities unified by Islam. Aminu Kano's Talakawas organized an Islamic uprising in the 1940s against both British and native control. In the 1970s and 1980s, groups like Yan Tatsine, led by Mohammed Marwa, opposed north-eastern Nigerian governance, resulting in conflicts with police and military involvement. Boko Haram blames Nigeria's issues on Westernization and has gained international attention due to ties with Al-Qaeda and ISIS, causing a humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad Basin.

1.2 FORMATION OF BOKO HARAM

According to Voll (2015), “The evolution of Boko Haram began with Muhammad Yusuf in Maiduguri, establishing a radical mosque influenced by Salafist ideology and opposing Western cultural dominance. Initially withdrawing, they later became an urban phenomenon, mirroring Ottoman Dan Fodio's methods. Yusuf's death in a 2009 security operation led to Abubakar Shekau's leadership, and Boko Haram declared jihad in 2010, conducting coordinated attacks. Their doctrine opposes Western civilization, emphasizing the impurity of Muslim beliefs with non-Islamic elements, and rejects women's rights, homosexuality, alcohol, prostitution, and Western-style schooling. Boko Haram seeks to establish a culturally restrictive vision based on a constrained understanding of Islam, differing from early jihadist movements in historical approach and exclusivity.”

Walker (2012), explained that “Boko Haram's core ideologies, rooted in Mohammed Yusuf's vision since 2002, aim to establish a state-like institution parallel to the federal government. They aspire to expand this organization, eventually replacing the existing state. The group has undertaken state-like tasks, including welfare, job training, small-scale industries, community resources, and acting as a moral police force. Even after the conflict began in 2009, these roles persisted, with stolen funds used to support the widows of fallen comrades. According to an interview with Yusuf, Boko Haram's goal is to create a new civilization dedicated to closeness to Allah, aiming for prosperity and success while eventually subjugating the rest of society. Inspired by Ibn Taymiyyah's writings, Yusuf endorsed the use of violence to overthrow oppressive authorities deviating from Sharia principles.”

1.3 BOKO HARAM

Lock (2020), contends that “Nigeria, a former British colonial territory created in 1914 through Lord Frederick Lugard's amalgamation policy, merged disparate British protectorates for low-cost colonial administration. The 1951 representative government was based on ethnic and religious affiliations, with three regions dominated by the Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and

Yoruba. The lack of objective criteria for designating majority groups led to the emergence of minorities, creating tensions, as seen in the Middle Belt region. The independence process further heightened ethnic identities, with political parties aligning with major ethnic groups, including the Action Group for Yoruba, NCNC for Igbo, and NPC for Hausa-Fulani, competing for regional interests despite claims for political independence.”

Zenn et al (2013) assert that Boko Haram's rise in 2002 was influenced by the Iranian revolution of 1979, the imposition of Sharia Law in twelve northern states since 1999, and the 9/11 attacks in the United States. The Shia population, led by Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky, experienced growth in northeastern states due to ideological fertile grounds and financial support from Iran. After the 2009 clash, Boko Haram's leaders exploited a pre-radicalized populace, transforming a socio-religious group into a violent militant sect and recruiting new members. Increased Sunni radicalization in northern Nigeria since the 1970s contributed to groups like Boko Haram. Leaders attributed extremism to issues like corruption, poor leadership, and unemployment, drawing inspiration from international jihadist movements, particularly the Taliban. Factors like ideological alignment, financial incentives, the desire for an Islamic state, and revenge against the government were identified as contributors to recruiting new members into Boko Haram.”

Punch’ (2009), explained that “in July 2009, Mohammed Yusuf's attempt to establish an Islamic nation in Maiduguri led to an armed rebellion, resulting in a federal government crackdown and approximately 800 deaths. Buji Foi, accused of funding Boko Haram, was arrested and killed. After the killing of Foi, Yusuf was captured by Nigerian military troops, tortured, and subsequently died in police custody. One of Yusuf's followers, Baba Fugu, voluntarily went to the police station to reveal sponsors' identities but was extra-judicially killed by the police. This situation prompted Yusufiya and its followers to go underground due to fear of being targeted.”

Figure 3: Mohammed Yusuf (The Guardian 2016).



The Guardian 2016, Photo of Mohammed Yusuf then leader of Boko Haram arrested, digital image, accessed 30, March 2024. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/04/join-us-or-die-birth-of-boko-haram>

According to BBC (2011), Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram, orchestrated several deadly bombings in Nigeria. These attacks targeted various locations, including the UN headquarters in Abuja, a Catholic church in Madala, a motor park in Nyanya, markets in Borno, and Christian villages in Borno and Kaduna. The bombings extended to residences and businesses, resulting in a significant loss of life. Boko Haram claimed responsibility for these attacks, including a 35-person murder attack on St. Theresa's Church in Madalla, near Abuja. Reuters (2013), Boko Haram, designated as a terrorist organization, claimed

responsibility for the bombing of St. Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla, on the outskirts of Abuja, which also wounded 57 people in the deadliest of a series of attacks during Christmas.

This attack signifies Boko Haram views Christians as infidels and believes they should either convert to Islam or face violent consequences. The attacks are part of Boko Haram's broader agenda to establish an Islamic state governed by their extremist interpretation of Sharia law. However, Boko Haram like every other Jihadist Islamic even in 2024 sees any other faith apart from Islam as infidels.

Figure 4: Destroyed UN building (Guardian, 2011)



The Guardian 2011, image of destroyed UN building, accessed 30 March 2024.
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2011/aug/26/bomb-abuja-united-nations-offices>

Figure 5: Destroyed Mandala Catholic Church (MailOnline 2011)



Mail Online 2011, destroyed Mandala Catholic Church, digital image, accessed 30, March 2024.
<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2078450/Bombs-kill-32-Catholic-churches-Christmas-Day-mass-series-explosions-rock-Nigeria.html>

Figure 6: Destroy Nyanya Motor Park (CNN 2014)



CNN, April 14, 2014, destroyed Nyanya motor park, accessed 30 March 2024.
<https://edition.cnn.com/2014/04/14/world/gallery/nigeria-bus-station-blast/index.html>

BBC (2014), reported that on the night of 14-15 April 2014 few months before the country's general election, Boko haram unleashed a different tactical attack by Kidnap of about 276 Chibok school girls aged 16-18.

Figure 7: kidnapped Chibok School girls (BBC 2016)



BBC News 2016, kidnapped Chibok girls, accessed 30 March 2024. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37641101>

Table 1: Details of Boko Haram's attacks (Global Center for Responsibility Project, 2024, and BBC Monitoring 2018)

Years	Attacks	Deaths
January, 2012	Vehicle-borne IEDs detonated in Kano state, Nigeria	About 200 deaths were recorded
April 14-15 night 2014	Chibok girls numbering over 250 were kidnapped in northeast Maiduguri. This incident generated public concern and attracted international attention. In 2017 the Nigeria government brokered a deal for the release of some of the girls.	No casualty was reported
January 3-7, 2015	Baga killing. Boko Haram carried out a series of killings and destroyed about 16 villages in northeast Nigeria	About 2,000 persons were killed and dozens adopted
April 23, 2015	Boko Haram killed some people in Kukuwa-Gair village	About 174 persons were killed
July 28, 2017	Boko Haram ambushed and killed people at the border town of Maiduguri	About 40 deaths were recorded
January 20-24, 2018	Boko Haram attacked Jiri village in Jere LGA of Borno state	About 30 deaths were recorded
2019	Boko Haram attack at a funeral in Bagu, Nganzai, Borno State	About 70 persons were killed.
2020	Boko haram ambushes the governor of Borno state. Boko Haram killed fishermen	In the two attacks about 48 deaths were recorded

2021	Boko Haram attack Goronyo market in Goronyo LGA Sokoto state	About 43 people were killed
November 1, 2022	Boko Haram attack Gorokanyeya village in Gaidam LGA, Yobe state	About 40 deaths were recorded.
December 5, 2023	Boko Haram attack Tudun Biri, Kaduna state	About 85 persons were killed
November 23-25, 2023	Boko Haram attack Barkin Ladi village in Zamfara state.	About 190 deaths were recorded
January 3, 2024	Boko Haram attacked Kajuru village in Kauru LGA of Kaduna state	About 42 persons were killed

BBC Monitoring, 2018, details of Boko Haram's killings, re-accessed 30 March 2024.
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42735414>

Global Centre for Responsibility to Project 2024, details of Boko Haram's killings, re-accessed 30 March 2024.
<https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/nigeria/>

However, the table depicts the frequency of Boko Haram's attacks on communities, farmlands, and government installations over the years. The tale represents only but few attacks carried out by the Boko Haram insurgency. Perhaps, significant in the table is how successfully these attacks are carried out, and the casualty recorded in each of the attacks is alarming.

1.4 NIGERIA

According to Tonry (2014), "Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, comprises over 250 ethnic groups, with the Hausa-Fulani making up 29%, Yoruba 21%, Igbo 18%, and Ijaw 10%. Weak institutions, a fragile civil society, numerous tribal groups, and widespread corruption characterize the post-colonial state. Successive military regimes turned the state into a corrupt enterprise, with officials engaging in criminal activities for personal gain. Despite democratic elections, corruption persists, and the state is viewed as a political prize for personal, family, ethnic, or tribal interests. The issue goes beyond corruption, as the political elites are seen as part of a political-criminal nexus. The exploitative nature of the state, entrenched corruption, cultural impunity, widespread poverty, and limited opportunities contribute to criminal activities appearing attractive as alternative career paths."

Udi (2023) posits "Nigeria exported cocoa beans valued at N42.24 billion in the third quarter, a mere 0.41% of total exports. The previous quarter's cocoa bean exports were N30.79 billion. Petroleum oil exports in 2023 reached a staggering N8.53 trillion, constituting 82.5% of total exports. This marked a 53.63% increase compared to the previous quarter's N5.58 trillion. Additionally, Nigeria exported goods worth N1.01 trillion, accounting for 9.82% of total exports. Natural gas exports surged by 58.99% from N639 billion to its current value. Overall exports rose from N81.21 billion in 2023 to N109.68 billion a 33.41% increase. Notably, exports of items like N27.49 billion in the third quarter marked a 24.72% increase over N22.04 billion."

Figure 8: Map of Nigeria



Maps Nigeria. Downloaded via <https://maps-nigeria.com/map-of-nigeria-showing-the-36-states>

Worldometer Report (2024), observed that “Nigeria's population as of Saturday, February 24, 2024, is about 227,250,656. The population of Nigeria makes up 2.78 percent of the world's total population. Nigeria is ranked sixth among the nations. Nigeria has a population density of 246 persons per km (636 persons per mi²). Nigeria's total land area is 910,770 km (351,650 sq. miles), with a 53.9 percent urban population (120,696,717 in 2023). The country's median age is 17.2.”

According to Whiting (2019), “Nigeria is the giant of Africa, attributing its name to its massive population, diverse peoples, vast terrain, and abundant natural resources like oil. The country features expansive plains and savannas, with the Yoruba residing in the southwestern plains, the Igbos in the eastern plain, and the Hausa-Fulani in the northern part. Nigeria boasts at least 250 spoken languages, deeply rooted tribal art, and music traditions. The nation faces societal challenges, including political, ethnic, and religious tensions, alongside disparities in oil resource distribution. Politically and economically, Nigeria stands as the most significant nation in West Africa, holding considerable influence and wealth, particularly through its main export, oil. Additionally, important export goods include rubber and cacao, contributing to Nigeria's economic significance in the region.”

Image Nigeria (2022), highlighted that “Nigeria is a member of both the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) and the Africa Union (AU). Nigeria is one of the main sources of funding for these two organizations is Nigeria.”

Alli, (2012), believed that “Nigeria holds a leadership role in West African security strategy due to its geostrategic and resource advantages, including abundant solid minerals, oil, and gas. Despite significant revenue from oil exports, there is room for expansion in gas, solid minerals, and agriculture. With the largest and well-equipped military forces in the subregion, Nigeria is the principal and leading regional actor, defining its national role conception and actively participating in African issues. The commitment to anti-apartheid movements and national liberation in the 1970s and 1980s, as part of the Frontline States, showcases Nigeria's influential role and its position as the global leader in Africa, particularly in West Africa.”

AFDB (2023), highlighted that “Nigeria's real GDP growth decreased from 3.6% in 2021 to 3.3% in 2022, primarily as a result of lower oil production. Food and energy price increases, along with the knock-on effects of declining exchange rates, caused inflation to reach a two-decade high of 18.8%. The percentage of nonperforming loans in 2022 was 4.2%, which was less than the 5% criterion that was necessary. The capital adequacy ratio reached 13.8% in 2022, over the 10% regulatory requirement. The percentage of unemployment (33.3%) and the multidimensional poverty rate (63%) both continued to be high.”

Igwe (2023), argued that “Nigeria's past demonstrates how past regimes have failed to effectively address terrorism, despite significant financial commitments spanning twelve years. Despite government initiatives, incidents of terrorism, kidnappings, and banditry remain persistent, with security forces lacking sufficient responsiveness. Additionally, terrorists and bandits exploit weaknesses, such as collusion with select state security personnel, resulting in heightened insecurity, including extortion targeting small-scale farms.”

1.5 TERRORISM AND POVERTY

Poverty and terrorism are closely related, with poverty frequently being the catalyst for violence because of economic issues including resource scarcity and unemployment. The Boko Haram terrorist organization recruits frustrated or unemployed youths by accusing the government of corruption and promoting radical ideas. This is to say that poverty is a driving force behind violence, which in turn breeds terrorism. Scholars study this intricate interaction and find a link between economic hardship and a person's propensity to become radicalized. Poverty and terrorism both lead to violence, which feeds the cycle of instability in society.

For example, Mustafa (2018) asserts that “Boko haram terrorist organization has been a major security challenge, with socio-economic factors contributing to the group’s recruitment tact. Invariably, the Boko Haram group capitalized on the economic lack that the people were experiencing to lure them into joining the group. However, to a certain extent, the group helps in poverty alleviation by giving financial assistance and other aids to its members which they continue to offer even at the early stage of violence.”

Ibrahim (2011) further explains that high levels of poverty, unemployment, and inequality in the northeastern region of Nigeria create an environment conducive to radicalism and recruitment into extremist groups, in the case of Boko Haram where a large number of people joined the group.

1.6 BOKO HARAM RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

Blanchard (2016), contends that “Boko Haram, initially did not call for violence, engaged in skirmishes with Nigerian police in its early years. In July 2009, Nigerian security forces' efforts to suppress the group resulted in at least 700 deaths, including the killing of the group's leader, Mohammed Yusuf. After going into hiding, Boko Haram resurfaced under new leadership in 2010, orchestrating a large prison break. Boko Haram built ties with transnational extremist organizations like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), receiving training and access to sophisticated weaponry. Since 2011, Boko Haram attacks have involved improvised explosive devices (IEDs), car bombs, suicide attacks, as well as the use of small arms and arson.”

Kalu-Idika (2020), added that “Boko Haram uses brutal force, combat, and suicide terrorism to achieve its objectives. All this has manifested in the activities of the members and has also been communicated to the general public through the use of social media, precisely through consistent YouTube videos of their spokesman and leader, Abubakar Shekau, the group has modified its strategy through the years. Old methods like killing security officials, village heads, and security operatives changed to bombing infrastructure, marketplaces, and kidnapping. Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS in March 2015 and split into two

factions. Abubakar Shekau continues to lead the Boko Haram faction and Umar Al-Barzani led the IS-West Africa faction which pledged allegiance to IS Iraq and Syria.”

Campbell (2015), contends that “Boko Haram, ISIS, and Al-Qaeda emerged from the Salafist ideological school of Islam. Salafism is puritanical in style of living and is characterized by rigid adherence to Islamic law, sharia, and its harsh punishments. Boko Haram, ISIS, and Al-Qaeda have emerged in regions that experienced colonialism and are characterized by a history of elite exploitation of the poor, notoriously bad governance, and popular marginalization.”

Nigerian National Newspaper “This Day” (2021), pointed out that ISWAP split off from Boko Haram in 2016 and pledged allegiance to ISIS a more sophisticated foreign terrorist organization that is decimated in the Middle East, shifting its energy to insurgency in Africa. This was not a good development for Nigeria, Mali, Chad, Cameroun, and other neighbouring countries in West Africa.”

Onwudiwe (2015), contends that “there may be increasing cooperation, but Boko Haram remains primarily driven by local grievances rather than serving as a mere extension of Al-Qaeda. It is easy to blame radical religion, but it may also be a truism that the same system-to-system factors unemployment, economic marginalization, lack of equal opportunity, injustice, inadequate education, political corruption, and inadequate electricity power, among others motivate groups like Boko Haram.”

Anyadike (2018), argues that “the fluidity of alliances in the Jihadist connection suggests that Boko Haram relationship may shift based on strategic consideration, this is because Boko Haram had some followers in Niger, Chad, and Cameroun right from the group’s beginnings. Nigeria's neighbours were spared the fighting until 2014 since they served as a rare base for the insurgents who had made a sort of mutual non-aggression pact with the local government.”

1.7 BOKO HARAM’S ROLE IN CONTRIBUTING POVERTY IN NIGERIA

Boko Haram's devastating influence on transportation networks, telecommunications, power supply, farmers, and villages has worsened economic hardships and heightened poverty rates, particularly in northern Nigeria. The group's relentless attacks on critical infrastructure and communities have disrupted essential services, impeded agricultural activities, and instilled fear among residents, hindering economic growth and development. As a result, the already marginalized regions of the country have been plunged deeper into poverty, with livelihoods shattered and opportunities for advancement severely restricted (Guardian, 2020).

1.8 DESTRUCTION OF THE TRANSPORTATION NETWORK BY BOKO HARAM

Haruna (2020) explains that Boko Haram's attacks on transportation infrastructure, including roads and bridges, have hindered economic activities, isolated communities, and disrupted supply chains, contributing to increased poverty in northern Nigeria. The destruction of key routes, such as the Kano-Maiduguri highway, has further exacerbated economic challenges in affected areas.

Campbell (2020) the destruction of bridges and frequent attacks on travellers have isolated not only Maiduguri but also numerous other residents of Borno state from accessing

neighbouring areas. Responding to these challenges, the Nigerian army has evacuated several villages along the highway, leading to hardship and resentment among the affected residents and sparking tensions between the governor of Borno state and the military.

Egbejule (2022), posits that “suspected Boko Haram terrorists ambushed a train travelling from Abuja to Kaduna, bombing its tracks and abducting dozens of passengers, with an unconfirmed number of fatalities and many still missing. This incident occurred shortly after unidentified gunmen attacked Kaduna airport, resulting in the death of an official on the runway, prompting its closure. The railway route, inaugurated in 2016, provided a secure alternative for many civil servants commuting between Abuja and Kaduna amid growing insecurity on northern roads plagued by Boko Haram.”

Marama (2014) highlights the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by Boko Haram militants under the Madafuma bridge, disrupting the Biu-Damboa-Maiduguri federal road. This tactic, ongoing for two years, has turned the route into a death trap, forcing travellers to avoid it and choose alternative paths through Gombe state instead of Maiduguri, resulting in increased travel time.

1.9 DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE AND POWER SUPPLY

According to Onuoha (2013), in 2012, Boko Haram executed a coordinated two-day attack on telecom masts in northern Nigeria, targeting cities such as Bauchi, Gombe, Maiduguri, Kano, and Potiskum. The group claimed responsibility, citing the assistance provided by telecom operators to security agents. These attacks, predominantly on base stations, introduced a new dimension to existing security challenges, leading to the destruction of entire base stations with IEDs and incendiary devices. As a consequence, the assaults on telecom infrastructure resulted in network outages, poor service delivery, increased dropped call rates, connectivity issues, and voice clarity problems. Beyond voice calls, data services were also compromised, impacting internet browsing effectiveness. This disruption extended to the national system, affecting services like banking that rely on the voice calls and data services provided by the telecom sector.”

Alu (2015) added that “a lot of Base Transceiver Stations (BTS) had been destroyed due to terrorist activities. This has led to unavoidable communication hitches such as drop calls, and no network coverage in these locations. Telecom operators lose millions of naira to vandal activities which affects the service delivery and a lot of money is spent to resuscitate damaged equipment. About N24,750,000 is spent during the installation of a Base Transceiver Station (BTS) together with its towers, special antennas, and two generators to power the station.

BBC (2012), reported that the militant Islamic group Boko-Haram had attacked nine mobile phone companies, the first time they have been targeted. Boko-haram had threatened to launch such attacks, accusing the mobile phone firms of helping security agencies monitor its members. Gunshots and explosions were heard and fires raged as mobile phone masts were targeted in northern Nigeria’s main cities, Kano, Gombe, and Bauchi.”

However, Boko Haram attacks on power infrastructure had widespread consequences for the national power grid, creating a ripple effect that disrupted power supply across the entire country.

Energy Commission of Nigeria (2018) highlights instances where Boko Haram attacks on critical power installations led to a significant drop in the national grid's capacity, causing prolonged power outages. Attacks, such as the one in Molai, impacted industries and worsened socio-economic conditions. The deliberate damage to power facilities by Boko Haram disrupted the electricity supply in Maiduguri and Damaturu, affecting transmission lines and creating days of darkness for residents.

International Crisis Group (2016) points out that Boko Haram's targeting of power sector personnel had severe consequences on facility functionality and maintenance. Kidnappings and attacks on engineers and technicians led to a shortage of skilled personnel, creating an atmosphere of fear and insecurity. This discouraged professionals from working in affected regions, hindering the government's efforts to restore and secure the power supply.

Human Rights Watch (2017) states that Boko Haram's attacks on power infrastructure were a deliberate strategy to destabilize Nigeria. Targeting transmission lines and power stations, the group caused severe disruptions and widespread blackouts. These systematic attacks incurred immediate repair costs, created uncertainty, and hindered investments in the power sector.

Vanguard (2024) reported that “on February 15, 2024, MTN subscribers in major Nigerian cities in Northern Nigeria experienced a four-hour blackout, unable to use services due to fibre cuts by suspected Boko Haram terrorists. Frustration escalated online, highlighting recurring challenges for telecom sabotage, destruction, and theft often damaging fibre optic cables, disrupting important services, and hindering economic activity. However, vandalism resulting from Boko Haram's activities contributes to a rise in poverty due to its impact on commercial phone call businesses, a significant source of income for many. The disruption caused by this vandalism leads to economic hardship as businesses suffer breakdowns. This worsens the poverty rate in affected areas, compounding the challenges faced by the populace. Boko Haram's actions have far-reaching consequences beyond just security concerns, affecting the economic stability and well-being of communities.”

1.10 ATTACK ON FARMERS AND VILLAGES

Apnews (2023), reported that “at least seven farmers were killed by Islamic extremist insurgents in northeastern Nigeria, a development that raises concerns about the region's ability to sustain food supplies. On Thursday, while the farmers were farming in their crop fields close to the Molai district of Borno state, the militants attacked them. The victims were met with a horrifying sight; some had their throats slit while others were completely beheaded.”

Monde (2023) says that” on Monday night, a significant contingent of fighters affiliated with the Boko Haram offshoot Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) launched an assault on the remote agricultural and herding town of Kayayya in Yobe State. The attackers deployed explosives and gunfire, targeting villagers engaged in nightly activities. The assault resulted in the deaths of approximately 17 individuals, with five others sustaining injuries as residents attempted to escape the violence.”

Vanguard (2024) reported that “Boko Haram's insurgency has prevented important economic activities in northeastern Nigeria, leading to population displacement, infrastructure

destruction, and disruptions in the agricultural sector. This has seriously affected food security and economic vulnerabilities, causing a decrease in agricultural productivity. Nigeria today is facing a serious food shortage leading to a mass protest in the country.”

According to Punch (2024), due to instability, seven important food-producing states in North-West and North-East Nigeria Borno, Adamawa, Kaduna, Katsina, Yobe, Sokoto, and Zamfara are susceptible to food crises in 2024. Lower living standards in the region brought on by violent conflicts may lead to food insecurity.

Vanguard (2024): Because of banditry's rampaging people, Nigeria has been grappling with a food crisis that has resulted in the high cost of food items in the market. Farmers are unable to travel to farms in the north.

However, in light of the attacks on farmers and communities, it is imperative to provide humanitarian assistance to ensure the delivery of aid to displaced populations and affected communities. This entails ensuring access to essential resources such as food, shelter, healthcare, and education, along with offering psychosocial support to survivors of attacks.

1.11 COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES TO COMBAT BOKO HARAM

The Nigerian government has launched Operation Lafiya Dole, the regional military collaboration, and the internal civil-military cooperation on Boko Haram as counterterrorism measures in response to the group's growing threat.

EASO (2018), explained that “to combat the Boko Haram insurgency, the Nigerian government has substantially depended on military deployments. Operation Lafiya Dole, or Peace by Force, is a major example of the determination to use force to bring about peace. Since its start in 2015, this operation has seen a large force deployment to the northeast, with a particular emphasis on states like Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, where Boko Haram has been most active. The objectives of military operations carried out by Lafiya Dole have been to destroy terrorist networks, apprehend important figures, and retake land that Boko Haram has controlled. Military deployments include Operation Chikin Gudu, Operation Ruwan Wuta I, ii, iii, and iv, Operation Deep Punch, etc.”

According to EASO (2021), Nigeria formed the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in 1994 to fight armed banditry that crosses international borders in the Lake Chad Basin. To address shared security issues, Benin joined in 2015, followed by Chad and Niger in 1998. After being reactivated, the MNJTF is currently concentrating on destroying Boko Haram and guaranteeing security in the impacted areas. The Nigerian government uses the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in the North-East Region to carry out counterinsurgency tactics in addition to traditional military operations. To address the root causes of terrorism, concerted action is required, and the CJTF works with the military forces on security initiatives with support from international organizations such as the African Union, the United governments, and Western governments.

Figure 9: Nigeria and Chadian military troops (TheDefencePost 2020)



TheDefensePost 2020, Nigeria and Chadian troops in operation, accessed 30 March 2024.

<https://www.thedefensepost.com/2020/01/04/chad-troops-leave-nigeria-boko-haram-iswap-mission-finished/>

TDP (2018), reported that “clearance operations in Cross Kauwa, Baga, and Doron Naira in the Lake Chad region were started by the soldiers of Sectors 2 and 3 of the Multinational Joint Task Force, which is made up of Nigerian and Chadian forces with coordinated air interdiction. The troops are in charge of clearing territory in Nigeria's Borno state and are a part of the Multinational Joint Task Force. Cutting off the Boko Haram Terrorists' supplies and communications was the operation's main objective.

Owonikoko (2022), “Nigeria has used a variety of tactics, including coercive and non-coercive measures, since the start of the Boko Haram insurgency. The BH has been targeted by a series of military actions, including Operation Lafiya Dole, Operation Hadin Kai, and Operation Deep Punch. To counter BH's actions in Nigeria and abroad, many auxiliary groups have also been formed, including the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), the Vigilante Group of Nigeria, the Hunters Association/Professional Hunters Association, and the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). But fighting the Boko Haram insurgency with just the military is not without its difficulties. Notably, it causes excessive money to be allocated to defence and security, frequently at the expense of important governmental sectors.”

Ike et al (2024) explained that the Nigerian government has launched multiple military counterinsurgency operations, aided by Vigilante Groups, the Multinational Joint Task Force, and volunteer organizations like the Civilian Joint Task Force. Despite claims of technical defeat by President Muhammadu Buhari's administration, the effectiveness of these operations remains uncertain. Concerns arise from Nigeria's significant military spending on combating Boko Haram, totalling US\$1.9 billion from 2009 to 2018, surpassing its neighbours in the counterinsurgency effort.

Adegoke (2023), opines that “on April 29, 2023, MNJTF forces in Tumbun Shanu freed four people they believed to be relatives of BH militants. Claiming to be fishing, the suspects were discovered with personal belongings and over 400,000 Naira in cash. A Boko Haram/Islamist States West Africa Province logistics supplier was captured by Sector 4 MNJTF in Diffa, Niger, in Kingorua. Items seized included rice, gasoline, engine oil, bread, and beverages. Furthermore, as part of Operation Koukouri, the MNJTF apprehended 18 BH/ISWAP terrorists and their accomplices, dismantling terrorist camps and an IED manufacturing facility while also obtaining firearms.”

Abdullahi (2024) explained that the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) announced the surrender of two commanders from the Boko Haram faction, on March 25, 2024. The commanders, Ibrahim Muhammed and Auwal Muhammed surrendered to Sector 3 MNJTF troops in Nigeria. This surrender is attributed to intensified military operations targeting terrorist groups within Sector 3 MNJTF. The commanders, active in the Lake Chad Islands, surrendered due to mounting military pressure. During preliminary investigations, they revealed their 15-year affiliation with Boko Haram and disclosed their operations in Kwallaram village. Various items, including weapons and communication devices, were recovered from them. The surrendered fighters are currently in custody for further investigation.

Foundation for Investigative Journalism (2023), reports a 23% decrease in terrorism-related deaths in Nigeria from 2021 to 2022, with a total of 385 deaths in 2022. The number of terrorist attacks also significantly dropped, from 214 in 2021 to 120 in 2022, marking the lowest figures since 2011. Military personnel became the primary target, comprising 25% of attacks, while civilians accounted for half of all terrorism deaths. ISWA remains the deadliest group, despite a decline in attacks and deaths in 2022, while Boko Haram's attacks decreased, leading to a notable improvement in Borno State's security situation.

For example, according to the Institute for Economics & Peace (2023), Nigeria ranks eighth in the world for terrorism impact based on the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) released in March 2023 positions Nigeria closely behind Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Mali, Somalia, Burkina Faso, and Afghanistan. Despite this ranking, there's a glimmer of improvement as Nigeria experienced a notable decrease in terrorist attacks between 2021 and 2022, with a 23 percent reduction in total deaths resulting from these attacks

For example, the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act of 2022 in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as outlined in Official Gazette No. 91 dated 16th May 2022, Volume 109, mandates that the “Law enforcement and security agencies are responsible for gathering intelligence to investigate specified offences and identifying targets for designation under relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. Additionally, they are empowered to enforce counter-terrorism laws and regulations within Nigeria, both domestically and internationally, to prevent and combat acts of terrorism and proliferation. They are authorized to facilitate detection and investigation, maintain secure communication channels, and conduct research to enhance preventive measures. Collaboration with Civil Society Organizations and the public is encouraged to provide education and support to prevent and eradicate terrorism and proliferation”.

1.12 THE ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN NIGERIA

Nigeria has been faced with persistent economic inequality, which poses a serious threat to the country's unity. A significant number of the population struggles with unequal access to resources, opportunities, and political representation despite economic growth and modernization.

OXFAM International (2024) says that despite Nigeria being the largest economy in Africa, extreme economic inequality persists. The country's expanding economy and abundant

human capital have the potential to alleviate poverty for millions, yet five million people face severe poverty while the five richest individuals hold a combined fortune of \$29.9 billion.

Umenwaliri (2023) highlights escalating tensions between the Igbo and Yoruba ethnic groups in Nigeria after the 2023 elections, attributing it to accusations of marginalization and exclusion. Tribal politics and poverty are interconnected, often leading to violence. The 1966 coup by Aguiyi Ironsi is cited as a historical factor with enduring consequences. Northern elites leverage tribal politics due to extreme poverty and religious divisions. Nigeria's poor rankings in the World Governance Index and high corruption perception further contribute to challenges. President Buhari's promises to combat corruption and insecurity are criticized for unfulfillment.

Okoi and Iwara (2021) argue that Nigerian political elites exploit poverty and illiteracy, using food items like rice to gain votes. Stomach infrastructure politics involves strategically associating candidates and parties with food on the packaging. This tactic was notably used in the 2015 Ekiti state election. The political culture in Nigeria tends to favour leaders with populist approaches over those addressing systemic issues.

Olusoji (2024) reports Nigeria's December 2023 inflation rate at 28.92%, impacting businesses and devaluing Naira assets. Investments failing to yield at least 28.92% suffered losses. The Naira significantly depreciated against the US dollar, reaching nearly N1,400:US\$1 in official and black markets, affecting businesses and investments.

For example, OXFAM (2021) explained that the richest individual's wealth could annually lift two million people out of poverty, emphasizing the stark contrast. Gender inequality is prevalent in the rural workforce, with women constituting 60-79% and facing challenges in land ownership and education. Resource mismanagement, evidenced by the \$20 trillion pilfered from the treasury between 1960 and 2005, contributes significantly to pervasive poverty. The lack of adequate funding for health (3.5%) and education (6.5%) in 2012 resulted in millions lacking clean water access, millions without safe water, and over 10 million children out of school, leading to increased unemployment, particularly among young people.

Perhaps, understanding economic inequality is essential to comprehending the dynamics of Boko Haram because it highlights Nigeria's ongoing inequality despite being the largest economy in Africa. Five million people live in abject poverty while a small number of people accumulate billions of dollars. As a result, socioeconomic issues exacerbate tensions and become entangled with ethnic and tribal politics. Political elites' exploitation of poverty, as evidenced by strategies like "stomach infrastructure politics," deepens communal rifts and fosters the growth of radical ideas. Furthermore, economic instability, as seen by high rates of inflation and currency depreciation, intensifies complaints and creates a climate that is favourable to extremism and violence.

Farmers are still afraid, though, because of Boko Haram's aggressive tactics, which include killings, community devastation, and bombings of farms. Among other things, this resulted in a scarcity of food production and an increase in Nigeria's poverty rate in 2024.

1.13 CONCEPTUAL EXPLANATION

POVERTY

The conversation about poverty has persisted as a divisive issue over time, leading to a variety of interpretations and approaches from academics that, although highly praised at first, have frequently been shown to be insufficient over time. Poverty is not only about not having enough money; it's about a range of socio-economic factors that are closely related to maintaining human dignity in particular settings, as opposed to merely following political correctness or cultural norms (Nyasulu, 2010). Poverty includes more than just a lack of resources; it also includes having access to necessities, social safety nets, and the freedom to express one's opinions and choose how to live (Nyasulu, 2010). It also depends on one's ability to bargain, one's social standing, and the presence of worthwhile job opportunities. Moreover, poverty serves as a foundational catalyst for numerous violations of labour and human rights, with conditions of destitution often breeding practices such as forced labour, human trafficking, and child exploitation (United Nations Global Compact, 2024).

The United Nations Global Compact (2024) highlights the importance of equitable employment opportunities, sustainable business endeavours, and economic restructuring as key components of poverty mitigation proposals. But even if employment is the main route out of poverty, it isn't as effective if it comes with poor working conditions. The ongoing issues were highlighted in 2019 by the predicament of over 630 million workers globally, or roughly one in five, who are trying to lift themselves and their families out of extreme or moderate poverty (International Labour Organization, 2024). The goal of reducing poverty necessitates a persistent dedication to protecting labour and human rights, which is embodied in the concept of decent work an employment model defined by equitable compensation, job stability, and family assistance (International Labour Organization, 2024).

In general, good jobs also encompass opportunities for personal development, social integration, and participatory decision-making, underpinned by principles of gender equality and universal access to societal opportunities through comprehensive poverty alleviation initiatives.

TERRORISM

Silke (2019), in the Routledge Handbook on Terrorism and Counterterrorism, asserts the elusive nature of defining terrorism, attributing this challenge to its perpetual evolution throughout history (pp. 13-15). Within a given timeframe, actions deemed terrorist by one group may be construed as acts of liberation by another, blurring the lines between terror and heroism. The Terrorism Act 2000, applicable both within and outside the UK, outlines terrorism as the employment or threat of specified actions aimed at influencing governmental bodies, international organizations, or instilling fear within the public (United Kingdom Terrorism Act, 2000). These actions encompass serious violence against individuals, substantial property damage, endangerment of lives, and disruption of electronic systems. Moreover, the Act emphasizes that the use or threat of firearms or explosives, irrespective of their intent, qualifies as terrorism, underscoring the severity of such acts (United Kingdom Terrorism Act, 2000). This legislative framework aims to delineate the boundaries of terrorism while acknowledging its multifaceted nature and the challenges inherent in establishing a universally accepted definition. International terrorism transcends national

boundaries in terms of tactics, targets, and operational hubs. With the emergence of Al Qaeda in the 1990s, international terrorism has become largely synonymous with Islamist extremist ideologies. Groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), operating primarily in regions such as Syria and Iraq, demonstrate both the intent and capability to execute attacks against Western interests (Lumina, 2007).

Schmid (2023) defines terrorism as intentionally harming innocent individuals to induce fear for political motives, contrasting it with established governmental systems and shaping terrorist identities. Depending on the rationality of governance, terrorists manipulate emotions or employ moral narratives. However, Maskaliunaita (2002) suggests governments can also engage in terrorism, prioritizing psychological impact. Technological advancements have expanded violence into cyberspace, where cyberterrorism exploits the internet for political coercion through actions like data theft. Combatting terrorism requires a comprehensive approach due to its devastating effects on individuals and organizations, as highlighted by Saman (2024). With evolving technology, which made interconnectedness more frequent, the threat of terrorism grows, necessitating adaptive strategies from law enforcement and governments proactive strategies.

However, in general, the consequences of terrorism are the same be it technological, physical, sociological, economic, and otherwise, this is because terrorism tends to instil fears and cause harm.

CHAPTER TWO

THESIS LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, DEFINITION OF THESIS CONCEPTS, METHODOLOGY, RESEARCH DESIGN, GENERAL SOURCE OF DATA, METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION, AND METHOTHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS (PAGES 32-39)

2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW

This study draws from an extensive literature review encompassing scholarly studies, journals, articles, and online Newspaper publications, among other reputable sources. However, the literature review encompasses various perspectives on the complex phenomenon of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Highlighting key contributors to the discourse, the following selected works are examined in light of recent occurrences:

Agbibo (2013) delves into the historical roots of militant religious movements in Northern Nigeria, emphasizing the solidification of Islam's role in the northern region's ruling class identity. Zenn (2013) explores Boko Haram's links to global jihadist movements and its recruitment tactics, citing factors like unemployment, bad leadership, and corruption.

Mustafa and Abubakar (2023) highlight Boko Haram's attribution of Nigeria's problems to Westernization and its connections to Al-Qaeda and ISIS, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad Basin. Kalu-Idika (2020) notes Boko Haram's allegiance to ISIS and its factional split. Ike et al. (2024) discuss the uncertainties surrounding the effectiveness of government efforts against Boko Haram, despite significant military spending.

Owonikoko (2022) outlines auxiliary groups formed to counter Boko Haram's actions. OXFAM International (2024) underscores Nigeria's economic potential contrasted with severe poverty for millions.

2.2 BOKO HARAM'S ROLE IN CONTRIBUTING TO POVERTY IN NIGERIA

In general, insurgency tends to have a negative influence on a country's economic and security aspects, and insurgent terrorism has never yielded positive outcomes anywhere in the world. For instance, in Nigeria, discussing insurgency without mentioning the activities of Boko Haram would be incomplete as the study posits terrorism perpetrated by the Boko Haram terrorist organization. Voll (2015) noted that Boko Haram's insurgent activities intensified and became more ruthless following the leadership transition to Abubakar Shekau after the death of founder Mohammed Yusuf. Under Shekau's command, Boko Haram orchestrated deadly attacks such as bombings on civilians, government buildings, farmlands, and various other targets, expanding their operations beyond north-eastern Nigeria. In 2010, Boko Haram declared jihad and launched coordinated assaults, driven by their anti-Western ideology and opposition to certain aspects of modern society, including women's rights and Western education. Their goal is to establish a strict Islamic state, deviating from traditional jihadist movements in their approach and ideology (Walker, 2012).

The Boko Haram conflict has inflicted significant damage on the Nigerian economy. As a designated terrorist organization, Boko Haram has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks across the country. This heightened activity has adversely affected the business climate in Nigeria, discouraging potential investors. Mustafa (2018) highlights the substantial challenges posed by Boko Haram's actions on the country's economic stability. Boko Haram employs a range of violent tactics, including suicide bombings and armed attacks, to further its goals, resulting in increased incidents of rape, kidnapping, robberies, and conscription in affected communities (Kalu-Idika, 2020). Boko Haram, a designated terrorist organization, has profoundly disrupted economic activities in north-eastern Nigeria. The region's border towns, previously reliant on trade with neighbouring nations, now face challenges due to heightened cross-border traffic restrictions imposed by the group. This has resulted in significant declines in commercial activity across various sectors, including other businesses (Monde, 2023).

The escalating instability in the North, particularly due to Boko Haram terrorism, has significantly impacted the economic and security situation. Many individuals, including businessmen, are relocating to more peaceful areas within the country. Food costs have soared due to a significant decline in food transportation from the north to the south, where consumption is high. Southern merchants are reluctant to travel north for purchases due to safety concerns, resulting in piled-up and wasted food items. Farmers, who depend on these goods for their livelihoods, suffer the consequences of this situation (Vanguard, 2024).

Due to Boko Haram's significant impacts on economic, social, political, and governance in the country, contemporary Nigerian discourse is heavily focused on insecurity, militancy, insurgency, and terrorism. These issues have led to a 28.92% inflation rate in 2023 and a depreciation of the naira against the US dollar, nearing N1,400:US\$1 in both official and black markets. Consequently, businesses and investments have been adversely affected leading to a high rate of poverty (Olusoji, 2024). In addition to other economic challenges faced by Nigeria, such as Naira devaluation and excessive reliance on agriculture, terrorism has eroded investor confidence and pushed the country's economy into recession (Olusoji, 2024). Corruption and terrorism pose significant threats to every facet of the Nigerian economy, rendering it unstable. Despite Nigeria's abundance of natural resources, economic inequality persists, as highlighted by Umenwaliri (2023).

For example, Vanguard (2024) reports on Boko Haram's impact on economic activities and food security in northeastern Nigeria, leading to mass protests. Punch (2024) warns of food crises in states affected by instability, exacerbating food insecurity. Vanguard (2024) highlights how Boko Haram's activities in Nigeria have further aggravated the food crisis by hindering farming activities in the north.

The practical issues highlighted in 2024 underscore the urgent need to address and counter the activities of Boko Haram, and instability in Nigeria because these issues have led to population displacement, infrastructure destruction, disruptions in agricultural sectors, and a significant decrease in agricultural productivity. Consequently, Nigeria is facing severe food shortages and escalating food prices, exacerbating food insecurity and socio-economic vulnerabilities. Understanding and effectively addressing these challenges are crucial for safeguarding the well-being and stability of affected communities and for fostering sustainable development in the region and Nigeria at large.

Perhaps, the literature review for this study is important because it plays a crucial role in shaping the work process, informing the development, and supporting the arguments and findings that will be presented in the study.

However, the escalating terrorist activities in Nigeria have had a profound impact on economic growth, making it a concern for both the government and communities. The implications of violence and terrorism are evident in various aspects, including the loss of life and property within communities, as well as the substantial expenses incurred in addressing and resolving these issues. The costs associated with managing and combating violent crime and terrorism in Nigeria are exorbitant.

2.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The study views the issues elicited from the security challenges ravaging Nigeria especially the northeastern part of the country as the government's inability to provide for the basic needs of the citizens, and the government's inability to checkmate religious radicalism or extremism at the formation stage. This has become a major national security threat over the years as can be seen by the challenges posed by Boko Haram that have contributed to plugging the nation into a high rate of poverty in 2024. To understand the motivations and actions of Boko Haram, in this case, religion could be seen as the motivating factor. However, it is important to discuss Boko Haram through a theoretical framework that can elucidate the role of religion in shaping its ideology and operations. The religious fundamentalism theory provides a good framework for discussing Boko Haram's views, beliefs, and strategies within the framework of Islamic extremism. This is because Boko Haram's ideology was motivated by a strict religious interpretation of Islamic law known as Sharia law which dislikes social injustice, corruption, inequality, girl education, and bad governance, among others.

Razaghi et al. (2020) opine that religious fundamentalism is the method of those religious groups that look for the literal interpretation of original religious scripture or books believing that lessons learned from this type of reading ought to be applied to every aspect of society, economic, and political.

Based on Razaghi et al. (2020), religious fundamentalism theory posits that religious movements, including militant groups like Boko Haram, are driven by strict adherence to fundamental religious beliefs. These beliefs are often characterized by the interpretation of sacred scriptures and a rejection of modernity, secularism, or alternative religious interpretations. Within this framework, religion serves as the primary source of identity, authority, and legitimacy, guiding individuals and groups in their actions and worldview as can be seen in the propagation of Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram.

Using the work of Ishaku et al (2021) in analyzing this theory, Boko Haram's ideology is deeply rooted in a radical interpretation of Islam, characterized by religious fundamentalism. The group's name, which translates to "Western education is forbidden" in the Hausa language, summarizes its rejection of Western influence and commitment to a puritanical form of Islam. Boko Haram perceives Western education and culture as corrupting influences that undermine Islamic values and traditions, viewing them as manifestations of moral decay and cultural imperialism.

Central to Boko Haram's religious fundamentalism as can be deduced from the work of Ishaku et al (2021) is its quest for the establishment of an Islamic state governed by Sharia law. The group views this objective as a divine mandate and actively pursues it through violent means. Boko Haram regards the Nigerian state as corrupt, illegitimate, and un-Islamic, prompting its relentless insurgency against government institutions, security forces, and anyone perceived as supporting the federal government.

Moreover, Boko Haram's religious fundamentalism manifests in its extreme violence against civilians, government officials, and security forces. The group justifies its brutal tactics, including suicide bombings, massacres, and kidnappings, as necessary measures in its holy war (jihad) against perceived enemies of Islam as could be seen in the study of Ishaku et al (2021)

The rise of Boko Haram can be understood within the broader socio-political and economic framework of Nigeria's northeast region in states like Maiduguri, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe, Adamawa, and Sokoto. Poverty, marginalization, and government neglect have created fertile ground for Boko Haram's recruitment and expansion. Boko Haram exploits grievances and offers opportunities to the youths a sense of purpose, identity, and empowerment through its extremist ideology. Boko Haram capitalizes on existing ethnic, religious, and social tensions to mobilize support and justify its violent campaign as noted by the work of Ishaku et al (2021).

In his analysis, Ishaku et al (2021) posit that Boko Haram's religious fundamentalism is not confined to Nigeria but has transnational implications. Boko Haram has established connections with other jihadist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, and seeks to advance its agenda beyond Nigeria's borders continuously. This underscores the global dimension of religious fundamentalism and its impact on regional security and stability.

The religious fundamentalist perspective of Boko Haram's actions, including preventing economic activities and causing population displacement, as reported by Vanguard (2024) would be seen as efforts to establish their version of an Islamic state governed by Sharia law. They may justify their actions as necessary to combat what they perceive as corrupt and unjust governance and to create conditions conducive to their extremist ideology. The disruptions in the agricultural sector and resulting food shortages in 2024 may be seen as acceptable sacrifices in pursuit of their religious and ideological goals.

Viewing the recent abduction by Boko Haram in March 2024 as reported by (Daily Trust Newspaper, 2024) through the lens of religious fundamentalism, Boko Haram's actions reflect their extremist interpretation of Islam, which justifies violence against perceived enemies, including civilians. The targeting of vulnerable populations, such as internally displaced persons, underscores the militants' disregard for humanitarian principles and their commitment to imposing their radical ideology by force. The use of force and coercion to abduct individuals, particularly young girls highlights the militants' intent to instil fear and exert control over the local population. This incident illustrates how religious fundamentalism can fuel acts of violence and terror, resulting in further instability and suffering in affected communities

However, the religious fundamentalism theory provides valuable insights into the ideology and operations of Boko Haram. In discussing Boko Haram through this theoretical framework, we can better understand its motivations, goals, and strategies. However, it is important to acknowledge that Boko Haram's religious fundamentalism is just one aspect of a complex phenomenon influenced by various socio-political, economic, and historical factors. Effective counterterrorism efforts must address these complex dimensions to combat the threat Boko Haram poses in 2024. However, religious fundamentalism as a theoretical framework is important to this study because it serves as a critical foundation for the thesis process, and ensures its relevance and contribution to the broader knowledge.

2.4 DEFINITION OF THESIS CONCEPTS

Examining Boko Haram's stances on crucial ideals such as social justice, the rule of law, democracy, corruption, and the organization's perspective on women's education is our aim when identifying study themes. Understanding the sensibility of Boko Haram's ideology and how it impacts Nigeria's government, security, and civilian populace is vital.

Adejumo et al. (2022) claim that to create a society based on their interpretation of Sharia principles, Boko Haram sees social justice through the lens of an extreme interpretation of Islamic law. They feel that religious values should supersede secular laws, hence they react violently to perceived injustices and depart from their religious doctrine.

Boko Haram advocates for the dominance of Sharia law over secular authorities' application of the law (Walker, 2012). They prefer a justice system that is in line with their extreme ideology because they see secular legal systems as corrupt and illegitimate.

Social imbalance, according to Boko Haram, is the result of Western ideas taking hold and Islamic morals being abandoned (Ibrahim, 2017). Disenfranchised individuals are recruited into their ranks using exploiting frustrations stemming from economic injustice and social marginalization.

Since Boko Haram wants to establish an Islamic state under Sharia law, democracy is strongly opposed by the group (Ibrahim, 2017). Their religious convictions conflict with democratic norms, hence they frequently use violence to attack democratic institutions and procedures.

As a means of rationalizing their violent activities against state authority, Boko Haram denounces corruption in secular governments (Walker, 2012). They have, however, been charged with using dishonest tactics, like extortion and embezzlement, to finance their operations and hold onto territory.

Boko Haram believes that women should not be educated and considers this to be forbidden (Daily Trust, 2024). They support a rigorous application of Sharia law that limits women's rights, including access to education. Their latest kidnapping of females in the Borno IDP camp in March 2024 is evidence of this.

However, Boko Haram is regarded as a terrorist organization due to its violent strategies and extremist ideological stance. It originated in Nigeria and has expanded its influence across the border. The group developed a radical interpretation of Islam, often referred to as religious

fundamentalism, which heavily influences its views on various societal issues, including women's education, social injustice, etc.

For example, Boko Haram's stance on women's education is deeply rooted in its fundamentalist ideology. They view educating women as a deviation from their extremist interpretation of Islam, they fear that educated women may challenge their authority and ideology. This belief is reflected in their actions, as they have targeted schools and abducted schoolgirls to enforce their prohibition on education for women.

In another instance, applying the Religious fundamentalist perspective to Boko Haram's claims on social justice aligns with its belief that true justice can only be achieved through adherence to strict interpretations of religious law, in this case, Sharia laws. From this point of view, Boko Haram's actions may be seen as a misguided attempt to establish a society ruled solely by divine law, where secular laws are seen as incompatible with the divine order. Boko Haram's violent reactions to perceived injustices could be interpreted as a manifestation of their fervent dedication to upholding what they perceive as the true religious doctrine, even if it means deviating from conventional interpretations or resorting to extreme measures.

Connecting this to the paper, the reference to religious fundamentalism provides a framework for comprehending Boko Haram's motivations and actions regarding its ideological nexus, among others. By acknowledging the role of religious fundamentalism in shaping Boko Haram's ideology, the paper sets the stage for analyzing the complex dynamics surrounding Boko Haram's ideological nexus in the northeastern region affected by Boko Haram's extremist activities.

However, defining thesis concepts is important for clarity and precision in communication, ensuring that readers understand the specific meanings intended by the writers. It helps establish a common understanding of key terms, preventing ambiguity and enhancing the coherence and effectiveness of the thesis.

2.5 METHODOLOGY

Research methodology is the organized process of planning, conducting, and analyzing research to answer specific questions or solve problems. It includes the procedures, strategies, and methods used to collect and analyze data as well as the guiding principles of philosophy that inform the research process.

In essence, research methodology serves as a compass to help researchers navigate the complex landscape of academic inquiry by guaranteeing validity, coherence, and rigour at every stage of the investigation. It gives scholars the ability to precisely and purposefully navigate the intricacies of their chosen topic by outlining defined pathways for data gathering, analysis, and interpretation. In the end, research technique is the essence of academic inquiry; it promotes a methodical approach to solving universal problems and expanding human knowledge.

2.6 RESEARCH DESIGN

The research design chosen for this study is a case study or descriptive research design, aimed at exploring the effects of Boko Haram terrorism as a driver of poverty in Nigeria,

with a particular focus on the north-eastern region where Boko Haram's activities are concentrated. This design allows for an in-depth examination of the intricate relationship between terrorism and poverty, providing rich insights into the experiences of communities affected by Boko Haram's violence.

Qualitative research methods are employed to gather data, ensuring a nuanced understanding of the multifaceted impacts of terrorism on economic conditions in the northeastern region and the country at large. This approach is well-suited for investigating the effects of terrorism on economic development and the resultant effect that results in poverty.

Data collection methods are tailored to the qualitative research paradigm utilizing secondary or documentary data. The

document analysis of media sources, academic literature, etc provides contextual information and supplementary evidence to enrich the analysis. However, secondary data sources strengthen the validity and reliability of the research findings, and by gathering data from these sources, a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the relationship between Boko Haram terrorism and poverty in Nigeria can be achieved.

2.7 GENERAL SOURCE OF DATA

For this research study data were sourced through secondary sources. The secondary data were elicited using qualitative techniques. The secondary data were generated from textbooks, online newspaper publications, journal articles, magazines, and the internet, among others.

2.8 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

This refers to the methods or procedures by which the researcher intends to accomplish the objective of the research study. In this step, information pertinent to the topic or study question is gathered. This step involves gathering information or data relevant to the research question or problem. The data collection technique used in this study is document analysis. This is important and determines if the research study will be accomplished or not. In other words, this research study aims to derive its data from documentary sources which include textbooks, Newspaper publications, journals, and the Internet, among others. However, through descriptive research design, the study will examine the following: the effect of Boko Haram's action on food production (farming) in northern Nigeria in 2024; the effect of counterterrorism strategies of Nigeria (Operation Deep Punch, and Multinational Joint Taskforce) in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency highlighting the challenges and achievements in 2024; and unravelling Boko Haram's ideological nexus in 2024.

2.9 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS

To provide a thorough picture of the phenomena, the methodology for approaching data analysis on Boko Haram's actions includes qualitative methods. Narratives around the activities of Boko Haram are identified through the use of qualitative methodologies such as case study analysis of academic literature or media reports. With the help of these data

sources, scholars may build a strong framework for examining Boko Haram's operations and more thoroughly and accurately explain its goals, strategies, and effects. Using this approach makes it possible to validate and enhance findings, which improves the validity and reliability of the study's conclusions.

However, based on the research questions or problems, the research will be analyzed through some case studies.

Analysis 1: Boko Haram's ideological nexus in 2024. In 2024, Boko Haram's ideological nexus remains an important aspect of its operations, shaping tactics, and influencing its interactions with local communities, state actors, and the Nigerian government. Understanding this ideological foundation is significant for devising effective counterterrorism strategies and addressing the root causes of the group's resilience and endurance.

Analysis 2: The effect of Boko Haram's activities on food production (farming) in northern Nigeria in 2024. However, as of 2024, Boko Haram's actions are still causing food production disruptions in northern Nigeria, which worsens food insecurity causes economic hardship for the farming communities in the area, and puts a further burden on the already vulnerable agricultural sector.

Analysis 3: The effect of counterterrorism strategies in Nigeria (Operation Deep Punch, and MNJTF) against Boko Haram's insurgency, challenges, and achievements in 2024. Although there have been significant advancements in terms of territory gained and operational network destruction, Nigerian counterterrorism initiatives, such as Operation Deep Punch and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), will continue to confront difficulties in eliminating Boko Haram's insurgency in 2024.

However, we apply methodology in writing this thesis on Boko Haram to ensure a systematic approach to research, analysis, and interpretation. The reason is for clarity and precision, validity and reliability, insightful analysis, etc. To this end, methodology ensures a clear and precise framework for conducting research, enabling scholars to address specific questions or problems. Through methodologically sound research, this thesis contributes to a better understanding of Boko Haram, its drivers, and its implications for security, governance, and society, thereby expanding academic knowledge on the subject.

CHAPTER THREE

THESIS ANALYSIS (PAGES 40-47)

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Amidst the shifting global changes from 2020 to 2024, Boko Haram's activities remained a major point of concern to the northeastern region and the country in general. Analyzing their path reveals complex insights into terrorism's evolution and its effects. This case study highlights Boko Haram's ideological nexus and the complex economic hardship or poverty created by Boko Haram's actions through bombings, kidnappings, rape, conscription, etc. Understanding these intricacies is important for devising effective counterterrorism strategies and fostering stability in affected regions and Nigeria at large.

3.2 ANALYSIS 1: UNRAVELING BOKO HARAM IDEOLOGICAL NEXUS IN 2024

The terrorist group Boko Haram, which has strong ideological ties, is still a major threat to Nigeria and the wider West African region (Mustafa and Abubakar, 2023). The same philosophy still drives the group's violent deeds and recruitment drives in 2024. Understanding Boko Haram's theoretical underpinnings is crucial to countering the organization's influence and slowing the spread of extremism (EASO, 2021). For example, Boko Haram established a radical view influenced by Salafist ideology and opposed Western cultural dominance by learning from Ottoman Dan Fodio's methods. (Voll, 2015).

Boko Haram's radical interpretations of Islam, which include distancing themselves from secular government, Western education, and behaviours considered un-Islamic, are central to their ideology (Mustafa and Abubakar, 2023). The group's name, which loosely translates to "Western education is forbidden," emphasizes their fundamental opposition to secular education and Western influence (Mustafa and Abubakar, 2023). The leaders of Boko Haram advocate for the establishment of an Islamic state with Sharia law as its supreme law and advance a radical, puritanical view of Islam (Mustafa and Abubakar, 2023).

Fundamental to Boko Haram's ideology is the belief in the establishment of a caliphate based on their interpretation of Islamic teachings (Walker, 2012). The group's interpretation of Sharia law calls for the imposition of harsh penalties and restrictions on individual liberties. Boko Haram, who pose as the supposed leaders of Islam, wages a holy war (jihad) against the Nigerian government, foreign troops, and anyone who disagrees with their philosophy (Voll, 2015).

Boko Haram's ideology also includes a deep-seated resentment of the Nigerian government, which it claims is corrupt, and unfair, and marginalizes many ethnic and religious groups, especially in the country's predominantly Muslim north. By leveraging social injustices and pre-existing complaints, the group positions itself as a protector of the underprivileged and downtrodden, gaining support and drawing in new members (Mustafa and Abubakar, 2023).

Moreover, Boko Haram's ideology is deeply rooted in a narrative of resistance against purported foreign meddling and influence, particularly from Western countries. Because it feels that Western education, culture, and values threaten Islamic identity, the group seeks to

oppose and reject what it perceives as Western imperialism and neo-colonialism (Mustafa and Abubakar, 2023). Boko Haram takes advantage of this anti-Western sentiment to justify its brutal methods and win over those who are tired of what they perceive to be Western dominance.

Apart from its doctrinal foundation, Boko Haram employs sophisticated media and recruitment strategies to spread its message and attract potential members. Social media, internet forums, and local networks are used by the group to spread propaganda materials such as films, written statements, and audio recordings. This promotes the organization's ideological goal and justifies its actions.

Boko Haram's ideology is also flexible, changing to suit changing circumstances and geopolitical considerations. The group adjusts its plot and approach to capitalize on opportunities and get beyond roadblocks like military setbacks, internal conflict, and outside influences. Boko Haram has maintained its relevance and power in the face of continuous military intervention and international criticism thanks to its flexible ideology.

A comprehensive strategy that addresses the underlying causes of extremism and radicalization is required to effectively target the intellectual underpinnings of Boko Haram (Walker, 2012). This means that by promoting inclusive government, socioeconomic development, and religious tolerance, we can weaken the appeal of Boko Haram's message and worldview. To combat the group's recruitment and propaganda efforts, it also advocates for the use of deradicalization programs, community outreach, and customized messaging (Walker, 2012).

Resolving the problems that Boko Haram takes advantage of also necessitates addressing the root causes of instability and conflict, which include poverty, unemployment, and social rejection (Walker, 2012). Fortifying institutions, preserving the rule of law, and fighting corruption are crucial to thwarting extremist ideologies and halting the emergence of violent extremist groups like Boko Haram (Walker, 2012).

There are still issues to deal with, such as Boko Haram's tenacity, civilian deaths, scarce resources, instability in the area, and socioeconomic conditions that encourage extremism. Even yet, in 2024, Boko Haram's ideology will likely continue to be a major motivator for both its recruitment and deadly operations. Recognizing its extremist interpretation of Islam, anti-Western posture, and grievance-based exploitation is essential for successful countermeasures. Undermining Boko Haram's ideology and fighting extremism in Nigeria and internationally requires addressing the underlying reasons, advancing inclusive government, and encouraging socioeconomic growth.

However, building on the religious fundamentalism of Razaghi et al (2020) Boko Haram's ideological stance is viewed by religious fundamentalists as a strict interpretation of Islam, emphasizing the establishment of an Islamic state governed by Sharia law. For example, they may see Boko Haram's opposition to secular education, Western cultural influences, and its advocacy for jihad as aligned with fundamentalist interpretations of Islamic teachings as could be seen by Ishaku et al (2021).

3.3 ANALYSIS 2: THE EFFECT OF BOKO HARAM ACTIVITIES ON FOOD PRODUCTION IN 2024.

For several years now, Boko Haram, a terrorist group, has inflicted trouble throughout Nigeria, especially in Nigeria's northeast region. The insurgency has had a significant effect on many areas of Nigerian culture, including food production, apart from its direct violent activities. In 2024, the effects of Boko Haram's activities on food production had made Nigeria's already acute food shortage worse, sparking widespread demonstrations and worsening the nation's humanitarian situation. However, in 2024 Nigeria's food production has continued to suffer significantly despite food being essential for sustainability and human growth because farmers cannot go to farms for fear of being killed, farmlands are destroyed and access roads are disrupted due to Boko Haram's bombings on infrastructure, among others.

One of the key reasons for Boko Haram's significant impact on Nigeria's food production is the group's attack concentration geographically, to be precise, Borno state where Boko Haram originates shares a border with countries in Lake Chad Basin such as Cameroun, Niger, and Chad. Generally, the northeastern parts of Nigeria, where Boko Haram is most active, are the country's primary food-producing regions. These locations are well-known for their fertile lands and agricultural pursuits, significantly increasing Nigeria's food supply. In many regions, the disruption of agricultural activities by Boko Haram has resulted in a drop in food production. For instance, Vanguard (2024) clarified for us that the severe loss of food security has led to a decline in agricultural output and a worsening of the economic climate. Nigeria is currently experiencing a severe food crisis, which has led to several protests throughout the country.

Boko Haram's destruction of farming infrastructure and farmlands worsened the issues faced by farmers. The terrorist group is known for its attacks on communities, crop destruction, and disruption of irrigation and storage systems in the agricultural sector in the northern region especially in the northeastern states. These attacks not only cause acute losses but also have long-term repercussions on food output in the impacted areas. The incapacity of farmers to rebuild or repair damaged infrastructure and their lack of access to critical resources make it difficult for them to carry out agricultural activities in an efficient manner. For example, in Vanguard (2024), it is evident that the Boko Haram insurgency in northeastern Nigeria has caused significant disruptions to important economic activities, infrastructure damage, and widespread population displacement. In addition, the insurgency has caused disruptions in the agriculture sector.

Boko Haram's actions impact food production even if they do not directly target farmers and their crops. The conflict has also had an impact on the supply chains and networks of distribution for agricultural products. It is difficult to transport food from rural to urban regions and markets because Boko Haram militants regularly cause insecurity on the highways and transit routes in the affected areas. Nigeria's already severe food crisis was worsened by the interruption of the supply system, which resulted in food shortages in rural and urban areas. For instance, Haruna (2020) helped us comprehend how Boko Haram attacks on transportation infrastructure have exacerbated poverty in northern Nigeria by obstructing trade, dividing communities, and upsetting the supply chain. The damage to important routes, such as the Kano-Maiduguri highway, has made the affected communities' economic problems worse.

Food insecurity and reduced food production have important and far-reaching consequences. The impact of rising food prices due to scarcity is disproportionate for the poor and marginalized, who are among the most vulnerable segments of society. Families not having enough money to buy basic food products contribute to malnutrition and other health problems, particularly in children and pregnant women. The lack of access to enough nutritious food also makes it difficult to carry out programs that try to improve living conditions and lower poverty in Nigeria. For instance, Punch (2024) helped us realize that, due to insecurity, the food crisis in 2024 is expected to have affected seven significant food-producing states in North-West and North-East Nigeria: Borno, Adamawa, Kaduna, Katsina, Yobe, Sokoto, and Zamfara. Food insecurity has gotten worse in these places and throughout Nigeria as a whole due to the decline in living standards brought on by the terrorist group Boko Haram's deadly actions.

Furthermore, a lack of food worsens social unrest and tensions, as evidenced by the numerous rallies that have erupted in response to the current food crisis. The government's inability to address the root causes of food insecurity, particularly the consequences of Boko Haram's acts, has fuelled public dissatisfaction and frustration. The people of Nigeria want the federal government to take accountability and provide workable solutions to ensure food security for every Nigerian. The government's failure to appropriately protect farmers and address the underlying causes of the insurgency has only made the crisis and the suffering of the masses worse. For example, Vanguard (2024) confirmed that Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria has caused severe disruptions to agriculture, inflicted damage to infrastructure, and displaced people, all of which have impacted food security and economic stability. As a result, there is a severe food crisis in Nigeria, which has led to large demonstrations around the nation.

Chart 1: Prices of maize and sorghum in Nigeria



Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations

The above example shows that Nigeria, millet, sorghum, and maize wholesale prices moved in different directions throughout November 2023, but they remained much higher than they had been the previous year. Similarly, local rice wholesale prices fluctuated in different ways, whereas the price of imported rice either stayed the same or increased. The cost of rice, both domestically grown and imported, was higher than it was the year before. The naira's depreciation, poor crop yields in 2023, higher transportation costs, and strong domestic demand are all contributing factors to the rise in cereal prices.

In conclusion, Nigeria's food production in 2024 has suffered greatly and catastrophically as a result of Boko Haram's actions. The insurgency's disruption of agricultural activity, destruction of infrastructure, and disruption of supply networks have resulted in food shortages and large-scale protests. It is crucial to rebuild agricultural systems, protect

farmers, and deal with the root causes of the attacks to decrease Boko Haram's impact on food production and provide food security for all Nigerians. The humanitarian crisis could get worse and Nigeria's cycle of poverty and instability would persist if quick action is not taken.

3.4 ANALYSIS 3: OPERATION DEEP PUNCH (OPERATION LAFIA DOLE) AND MNJTF AS COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES.

Nigeria has mostly depended on Operation Lafia Dole, also known as Operation Deep Punch, and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to combat the threat posed by the well-known terrorist organization Boko Haram (Owonikoko, 2022). In 2024, these counterterrorism tactics will still be critical to defeating the insurgency. However, to guarantee their effectiveness, they also need to surmount several tough obstacles. This case study will look at the successes and challenges that the Multinational Joint Task Force and Operation Lafia Dole, also known as Operation Deep Punch, experienced in the ongoing fight against Boko Haram (Owonikoko, 2022).

However, MNJTF and Operation Deep Punch (Operation Lafia Dole) exemplify concerted efforts to combat Boko Haram's terrorist organization. These cases directly address the central questions of the paper (Boko Haram's ideological nexus, and the effect of Boko Haram's actions on food production in 2024, etc) by demonstrating the importance of regional cooperation, military operations, and humanitarian efforts in countering terrorism, offering tangible examples of how collective action and security measures intersect in addressing transnational threats like Boko Haram because Boko Haram is recognized as a terrorist organization.

SUCSESSES OF OPERATION DEEP PUNCH AND MNJTF

The Nigerian government's Operation Lafia Dole has been effective in stopping Boko Haram's activities in the country's northeast. The campaign has targeted Boko Haram camps, strongholds, and supply routes through coordinated military offensives, which has resulted in the terrorist group's capabilities being diminished. For instance, EASO (2018) maintains the military troops, operating within Nigeria's Borno state, are part of the Multinational Joint Task Force, tasked with clearing territory. Their primary objective is to disrupt Boko Haram Terrorists' supply lines and communications chain. In another instance, Adegoke (2023), affirmed that the MNJTF forces in Tumbun Shanu liberated four individuals believed to be relatives of BH militants on April 29, 2023, discovering them with personal belongings and over 400,000 Naira in cash while claiming to be fishing. Additionally, a Boko Haram/Islamic States West Africa Province logistics supplier was apprehended by Sector 4 MNJTF in Diffa, Niger, with seized items including rice, gasoline, engine oil, bread, and beverages. Operation Koukouri led to the capture of 18 Boko Haram/ISWAP terrorists and their accomplices, the dismantling of terrorist camps and an IED manufacturing facility, and recovering firearms (Adegoko, 2023).

Areas that were formerly held by Boko Haram have been liberated with remarkable success thanks to the MNJTF and Operation Deep Punch. The regaining of control over strategic locations by the Nigerian military and its partners has significantly weakened the terrorist organization's hold over the region, facilitating the return of displaced individuals and the establishment of stability. Consider EASO (2021). The Multinational Joint Taskforce and

Operation Lafia Dole are two examples of how the Nigerian government has primarily depended on military deployments to battle the Boko Haram insurgency. The northeast has been the focus of this operation, especially the states where Boko Haram is most active, like Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa (EASO, 2018).

However, with the soldiers from Chad, Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Benin comprising the Multinational Joint Task Force, regional forces can coordinate and work together more effectively in the fight against Boko Haram (EASO, 2021). The effectiveness of counterterrorism operations has increased as a result of collaboration in the sharing of military strategies, materials, and intelligence. For example, to combat armed banditry that crosses international borders in the Lake Chad Basin, Nigeria established the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in EASO (2021). Targets include taking down terrorist organizations, apprehending important individuals, and taking back lost land.

Apart from focusing on military activities, Operation Deep Punch and the MNJTF prioritized humanitarian help to the impacted towns (Dole, 2021). This means providing food, medical care, and other basics to refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) who have been affected by the conflict. These kinds of initiatives have minimized the suffering of innocent bystanders caught in the crossfire. For example, Abdullahi (2024) emphasizes how Boko Haram commanders, Ibrahim Muhammed and Auwal Muhammed, to Sector 3 MNJTF troops in Nigeria on March 25, 2024 (Abdullahi, 2024). Their surrender is a result of intensified military operations targeting terrorist groups within Sector 3. Active in the Lake Chad Islands, they surrendered due to mounting military pressure, disclosing their 15-year affiliation with Boko Haram and revealing their operations in Kwallaram village (Abdullahi, 2024).

The Multinational Joint Task Force has given Nigeria's efforts against Boko Haram recognition and support on a global scale (EASO, 2021). With the assistance of foreign allies and the cooperation of surrounding nations, Nigeria is today better prepared to combat the insurgency and address its root causes.

CHALLENGES OF OPERATION DEEP PUNCH AND MNJTF

Even with significant military losses, Boko Haram has shown to be a resilient and adaptable foe. The group continues to conduct attacks like raids, ambushes, and suicide bombers, aiming its weapons at both military and civilian targets. Boko Haram's ability to replenish its numbers continuously poses a threat to counterterrorism tactics.

Particularly in areas where military operations have occurred, allegations of civilian casualties and violations of human rights have plagued the fight against Boko Haram. The safety of civilian populations and accountability have come under investigation following reports of extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detentions, and mistreatment by security personnel. The persistence of these difficulties calls for addressing them to preserve the legitimacy of counterterrorism efforts and the confidence of the people.

Even with foreign help, the MNJTF and Operation Lafia Dole still face challenges because of a shortage of troops, equipment, and supplies. The northeastern region has logistical challenges for military operations because of its vast and rugged terrain. It also poses challenges for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts because of its low financial resources and capacity. For example, as demonstrated by Haruna (2020), Boko Haram bombs

shut down roadways. Because Boko Haram attacked infrastructure, supply routes have been disrupted, communities have been separated, and economic activity has been hampered, all of which have increased poverty in northern Nigeria. In the impacted districts, the destruction of important arteries like the Kano-Maiduguri highway has made the economic problems worse (Haruna, 2020).

Regional elements like political unrest, ethnic conflict, and transnational criminal networks are closely related to the insurgency in northeastern Nigeria. Boko Haram's international operations make it difficult to control the group inside Nigeria's borders. To effectively tackle terrorism in the region over the long term, efforts must be coordinated and the underlying causes of instability in neighbouring countries must be addressed. For example, Ike et al (2024) with assistance from multiple organizations, including Vigilante Groups, the Multinational Joint Task Force, and the Civilian Joint Task Force, the Nigerian government has launched multiple military counterinsurgency operations. Even though the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari claims to have defeated Boko Haram technically, questions remain regarding the efficacy of these operations, particularly in light of Nigeria's significant military spending of US\$1.9 billion from 2009 to 2023 more than its neighbours combined on counterinsurgency operations (Ike, et al. 2024).

Resolving the root causes of radicalization and extremism remains a significant challenge for the MNJTF and Operation Lafia Dole. Boko Haram takes advantage of conditions like marginalization, poverty, unemployment, and low education to enlist and radicalize vulnerable people. Achieving long-term peace and stability requires resolving these underlying socioeconomic concerns through comprehensive development and governance reforms.

However, Operation Lafia Dole and the Multinational Joint Task Force have achieved significant strides toward containing the threat posed by Boko Haram in Nigeria and the broader Lake Chad Basin region. However, the establishment and operationalization of the MNJTF align with the expectation of collaborative efforts among regional actors to combat Boko Haram's insurgency, supporting the hypothesis that collective security measures are important in addressing transnational terrorist threats effectively (EASO, 2021). Furthermore, their accomplishments in halting Boko Haram's activities, reclaiming territory, and aiding highlight how critical it is to tackle counterterrorism with a comprehensive, well-thought-out strategy. However, despite this, there are still a lot of challenges, including Boko Haram's persistence, civilian casualties, resource scarcity, local instability, and the socioeconomic factors that lead to extremism. To address these issues, there must be persistent political will, regional collaboration, and financial backing for security and development initiatives. Long-term peace and stability in the area will need to be achieved via concerted efforts and collective action (EASO, 2021).

However, the successes and challenges of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in combating Boko Haram directly relate to the thesis statement of purpose, which aims to analyze the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures, including Operation Deep Punch (Operation Lafia Dole) and the MNJTF. The successes of MNJTF, such as reclaiming territory and aiding affected populations, demonstrate the importance of regional cooperation and military operations in countering terrorism, aligning with the thesis's focus on exploring the role of collective action in addressing transnational threats like Boko Haram (EASO,

2021). Conversely, the challenges faced by MNJTF, such as civilian casualties, resource scarcity, and socioeconomic factors leading to extremism, underscore the complexity of counterterrorism efforts and the need for comprehensive strategies, which are central themes of the thesis (Haruna, 2020). Therefore, examining the successes and challenges of MNJTF contributes to a deeper understanding of the effectiveness and limitations of counterterrorism measures in the fight against Boko Haram, as outlined in the thesis statement of purpose.

Through qualitative data analysis of secondary sources, this case study or analysis has provided insights into the complex interplay between the Boko Haram insurgency and economic (farming) disruption in Nigeria, counterterrorism measures of Operation Deep Punch, and MNJTF operation in the Lake Chad basin, and Boko Haram's ideological nexus in Nigeria, 2024. However, the exploration of the long-term implications of conflict on food production, livelihoods, and socio-economic development in affected regions is shown in the analysis as well.

CHAPTER FOUR

THESIS FINDINGS (PAGES 48-49)

4.1 FINDINGS

An in-depth analysis of Boko Haram's ideological nexus in 2024, its effects on food production (farming) and poverty in Nigeria, and the role of MNJTF/Operation Lafia Dole as counterterrorism measures form the focal points of this thesis. Examining these cases illuminates the complex dynamics of insurgency, socioeconomic repercussions, and the effectiveness of regional security/military initiatives in addressing transnational threats within the context of contemporary affairs. However, based on the analysis, the study makes the following findings:

A radical version of Islam that rejects Western education and secular government forms the basis of Boko Haram's philosophy (Voll, 2015). Boko Haram advocates a hard interpretation of Islam and demands the creation of a Sharia-compliant Islamic state.

Boko Haram wants to establish a caliphate where Sharia rule is applied with severe penalties and restrictions on freedoms, based on how it interprets Islamic teachings. It regards itself as the defender of Islam and is engaged in a holy war (jihad) against those it regards as its enemies, including the Nigerian government and Western countries (Walker, 2012).

Figure 13: Boko Haram affects towns and communities



BBC News, Nigeria's Boko Haram 'Seize' Bama town in Borno, 2 September 2014, accessed 26 April 2024. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29021037>.

The Nigerian government is the target of Boko Haram's intense resentment, which it attributes to marginalization, injustice, and corruption, particularly in the Muslim northeastern region of the country characterized by underdevelopment, poverty, and unemployment while politicians amass wealth. It gathers popularity by using societal injustices and complaints to its advantage and presenting itself as a champion of the marginalized and oppressed by advocating its belief in egalitarianism (Walker, 2012).

Nigerian government declared Boko Haram to be a terrorist organization, and several other nations and international organizations have also acknowledged this designation. This was a result of violence perpetrated by Boko Haram such as bombings, killings, rape, and

jailbreaks, among others (Punch, 2009).

The country's food-producing region, north-eastern Nigeria, is the scene of the majority of Boko Haram attacks. These fruitful farming areas provide a large amount of Nigeria's food. But because of Boko Haram, farming has grown harder and food production has fallen. However, as a consequence, food production has declined, posing a threat to Nigeria's food security and exacerbating poverty levels in the northeastern region (Vanguard, 2024). Boko Haram's targeting of the food-producing regions underscores its strategy to undermine stability and economic development as can be seen in the chapter of this thesis.

Boko Haram has had a major detrimental impact on Nigeria's food output in 2024 by disrupting agriculture and causing food shortages which have led citizens to protest (Punch, 2024).

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and Operation Lafia Dole (Operation Deep Punch) are critical to Nigeria's fight against Boko Haram. Despite achieving some military successes, the MNJTF grapples with funding and capability issues, hindering its capacity to ensure sustained long-term stability in the northeastern region of the country (Ike et al, 2024).

Nigeria's counter-Boko Haram efforts have garnered international recognition due to the involvement of the Multinational Joint Task Force, as well as the cooperation of neighbouring nations and assistance from foreign partners.

Boko Haram's ideology is uncertain because it has evolved and is subject to reinterpretation by its leaders and followers. The group's initial focus on opposing Western education expanded to include broader antigovernmental and anti-Western sentiments, allowing it to adapt its narrative to suit changing circumstances and attract support from various citizens of the affected areas.

Over the years, the Nigerian government has spent billions of Naira fighting Boko Haram. To reduce poverty even in 2024, these monies may have been allocated to other sectors such as science, manufacturing, education, agriculture, and health, (Igwe, 2023).

CHAPTER FIVE

THESIS RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION (PAGES 50-53)

5.1 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the information derived in Chapter 1, it could be said that Boko Haram's activities significantly contribute to the perpetuation of hardship and increase in the rate of poverty in Nigeria in 2024. Chapter 1 likely outlined the economic effects of Boko Haram's actions, highlighting how their attacks disrupt economic activities, hinder development projects such as telecommunication lines, roads and bridges, and farmland, and create a climate of fear that prevents investment and economic growth.

Building upon the literature reviews in Chapter 2, which likely delved into the recruitment strategies and ideological motivations of Boko Haram, it is assumed that the group's exploitation of vulnerable populations and recruitment of impoverished youth worsened the cycle of poverty in affected communities, towns and villages in northeastern Nigeria even in 2024. Chapter 2 probably emphasized how Boko Haram preys on disenfranchised communities with promises of financial incentives or ideological appeals, further deepening the economic challenges faced by individuals and communities.

In Chapter 3, the major focus likely shifted to the government's response to Boko Haram and the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies in addressing the root causes of poverty. It is assumed that Chapter 3 highlighted the need for comprehensive strategies that not only prioritize security but also address underlying economic grievances, such as inequality, unemployment, and lack of access to education and basic services.

However, drawing from these insights gained in the study, the final recommendations emphasize the importance of total approaches that integrate security measures with long-term development initiatives. These recommendations include the following:

Countering extremist ideological influence and radicalization: Radicalization and extremist interpretation of Sharia law act as the ideological fuel that keeps Boko Haram's violent actions going. To effectively combat radicalization, the government must address the underlying issues and conditions that lead people to be receptive to extremist ideologies.

In areas affected by Boko Haram's activities economic inequality and political marginalization are major issues that need to be addressed to implement successful counter-radicalization programs. The government can counter the attractiveness of radical narratives that take advantage of frustrations about poverty, inequality, and lack of opportunity by investing in infrastructure development, education, and job creation (Vanguard, 2024). Furthermore, fostering inclusive political systems, open government, and transparency helps lessen the alienation and disenfranchisement that extremists frequently exploit (Ite, et al. 2024).

Moreover, community empowerment and engagement must be the government's main priorities in its efforts to fight extremist intellectual influence and radicalization. Local communities play a crucial role in identifying radicalization and preventing it at the grassroots level. The government may fortify its opposition to extremist ideologies by

fostering cooperation, communication, and trust among communities that are vulnerable to Boko Haram's influence. Civic and religious organizations that promote tolerance and peacebuilding are examples of community-led projects that can offer counternarratives to extremist messaging (Walker, 2012).

Addressing the root cause of poverty in regions susceptible to Boko Haram's influence:

In Boko Haram-affected communities, addressing the root causes of the insurgency necessitates implementing targeted poverty-reduction initiatives. The focus of these programs should be on employing diverse tactics to assist communities in escaping poverty. Job-creation initiatives, such as vocational training and entrepreneurship, provide a means of income for young people who might otherwise be at risk of being recruited by extremist groups. Access to vocational education is equally important because it gives people the skills and information, they need to resist radical beliefs and pursue better lives. Programs for healthcare, however, also ensure that communities have access to essential services, boosting general well-being and resilience. Infrastructure development such as the construction of roads, electricity, and water supply systems not only promotes economic growth but also fortifies social cohesiveness and the government's presence in underprivileged areas (Haruna, 2020).

Supporting victims and rehabilitation programs: To alleviate the catastrophic effects of Boko Haram's brutality, it is imperative that victims receive support and that thorough rehabilitation programs be implemented. Through the provision of both short-term assistance and long-term solutions, these programs offer comprehensive support to those impacted by the conflict. Livelihood support helps victims restore the financial security that was destroyed by the fighting. Furthermore, for victims to reconstruct their lives and regain a sense of normalcy, support with reintegration into society is essential.

Programs for the rehabilitation of ex-militants are also essential to disengagement and reconciliation efforts. These initiatives give ex-combatants a way to reintegrate into society by providing employment training, education, and community integration opportunities. This helps promote peacebuilding and reconciliation in the impacted areas while simultaneously narrowing the pool of possible recruits for Boko Haram. All things considered, aiding victims and putting rehabilitation plans into place are crucial steps toward healing people and communities harmed by Boko Haram's violence, as well as helping larger initiatives to advance stability and peace in the area.

Promotion of good governance: Encouraging effective governance is essential to tackling the underlying reasons behind Boko Haram's support. Governments can increase public trust in institutions by strengthening governance frameworks and battling corruption. Accountable and transparent administration promotes economic growth by resolving issues like marginalization and injustice that give rise to support for extremist organizations. This means that people are less inclined to resort to violent alternatives like Boko Haram when they believe their government to be just and responsive (Ike, et al. 2024).

Promoting economic development: If we are to address the underlying roots of Boko Haram's support, we must encourage economic development in areas devastated by insurgency. Governments can increase employment possibilities and the local population's standard of living by promoting economic growth (Ishaku, 2021). To attract new members, extremist organizations like Boko Haram frequently take advantage of fundamental

socioeconomic grievances like unemployment, poverty, and a lack of infrastructure. Economic growth resolves these issues. Extremist ideas are less likely to influence people when they can support themselves and their families and have access to economic opportunities, 2021).

Combating religious fundamentalism: To fight Boko Haram's religious fundamentalism in 2024, a diverse strategy is required. In the first place, it is imperative to strengthen security protocols and intelligence gathering to impede Boko Haram's operations and destroy its networks. Secondly, encourages interfaith communication and religious tolerance to refute extremist narratives and create a feeling of solidarity across disparate communities, as could be seen in the work of Ishaku, et al, 2021. Finally, to effectively combat Boko Haram's religious fundamentalism, information sharing, and coordinated measures are needed to address the transnational dimension of the danger posed by Boko Haram should be facilitated by improving international collaboration and coordination.

But in 2024, with all the unpredictability surrounding Nigeria and the northeast, dealing with Boko Haram's actions calls for a comprehensive plan. To effectively defeat the group's insurgency and lessen its impact on stability and security, this entails strengthening security measures, improving intelligence capabilities, and promoting regional collaboration. Investing in socioeconomic development, counter-radicalization initiatives, and community resilience is also crucial to addressing the root causes of Boko Haram's support and halting its future growth.

However, addressing the nexus between Boko Haram and poverty in Nigeria requires a complex approach that combines security, development, and governance reforms. By addressing the root causes of poverty and addressing the vulnerabilities exploited by extremist groups, Nigeria can work towards sustainable peace, stability, and prosperity for all its citizens.

5.2 STUDIES CONCLUSION

In conclusion, 2024 will be a pivotal year in the ongoing fight against Boko Haram, since the organization's ability to carry out attacks and further its extremist goals depends heavily on its ability to take advantage of religious fundamentalism. This emphasizes the urgent need for practical measures to address Boko Haram's terrorism, particularly in the northeast region of Nigeria. While military strategies and international support remain crucial, efforts to counter the group's extremist or fundamentalist ideology through education, community outreach, and religious discourse are equally important. By shedding light on the complexities of combating terrorism and highlighting the economic consequences of Boko Haram's insurgency, this study emphasizes the importance of a multiplicity approach to effectively address the threat posed by Boko Haram in Nigeria.

Perhaps, from a personal perspective, engaging with this research has deepened my appreciation for the complexities of terrorism and counterterrorism efforts in Nigeria. This has underscored the importance of adopting a holistic approach that addresses not only the security dimension but also the underlying economic grievances driving radicalization and conflict in the northeastern region and Nigeria in general.

However, the general outcome of this thesis is the explanation of the complex nature of Boko Haram's insurgence strategies and the challenges faced by counterterrorism efforts in Nigeria.

By delving into the sensibility of Boko Haram's ideology, tactics, and the economic context in which it operates, the research provides valuable insights for policymakers, scholars, organizations, and security personnel engaged in counterterrorism efforts.

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